ABSTRACT:
Theories of cognition and meta-theoretical frameworks provide important areas
for exploring some of the theoretical underpinnings of knowledge management
practice. Two areas of theory are
explored as potential fruitful for incorporation to knowledge management theory
and practice. Extended cognition, based
predominantly on the work of Andy Clark, is presented as relevant to KM, and
social constructionism is developed as similarly
relevant. Connections between extended
cognition and social constructionism are developed,
with implications for KM identified and briefly explored. Existing KM theory is compared, with
particular emphasis on the work of John Nosek’s
‘group cognition’.
Keywords: Knowledge
management, Meta-theory, Extended cognition, Social constructionism, Andy Clark, John Nosek
1. Introduction
Theories of cognition and meta-theoretical frameworks provide important areas for exploring some of the theoretical underpinnings of knowledge management practice. In recent knowledge management (KM) literature two articles provide particular methodological and subject precedence for the purposes proposed in this paper. John Nosek provides an intriguing exploration of group cognition based on a wide disciplinary synthesis, some of which will be addressed in this paper (Nosek, 2004). Of particular interest in Nosek’s work is the focus on cognitive theory; the ‘thinking’ of individuals as groups with implications for knowledge sharing and creation. Similarly Josephine Lang provides interesting insights into implications of investigating social context and the process of knowledge transfer (Lang, 2004; pp.89). Following Nosek and Lang, this paper seeks to explore a particular theory of cognition, extended cognition, and ally it with a meta-theory, social constructionism, within the context of knowledge creation and sharing. An emphasis on tacit knowledge will be proposed based on the language focus developed within arguments in this paper. I begin by introducing each of these topics before integrating them into knowledge management research and practice.
2. Cognition
And Meta-Theory
2.1. Extended
Cognition
Extended cognitive theory in its most basic form is the view that human
cognition is not limited to the biological brain. The main premise of the argument is that
humans employ external aspects of the environment to aid and/or enhance
cognition in a way that moves cognition outside the human body. This argument is explored in a variety of
forms across cognitive research, but the focus will be limited here to Extended
Mind arguments because of its unique application to knowledge management
theory.
2.1.1. The Extended Mind
Andy Clark, a strong proponent of the Extended Mind explains the central idea of extension as this:
…the project of understanding what is distinctive about human thought
and reason may depend on a much broader focus than that to which cognitive
science has become most accustomed, one that includes not just body, brain and
the natural world, but the props and aids (pens, papers, PCs, institutions) in
which our biological brains learn, mature and operate. (
Clark and David Chalmers wrote a paper titled ‘The Extended Mind’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) which is recognized as the instigation for widespread research into theories of the human mind extending outside the body. A comprehensive analysis of Extended Mind arguments is not possible in the space here; instead I will briefly present the argument for the Complementarity version of the Extended Mind.
2.1.2. The Complementarity Argument
Extended Mind (EM hereafter) proponents claim humans are surrounded by
cognitive tools, which play integral roles in our cognitive life. The EM explanation of the ability humans have
to exploit and utilize cognitive tools develops the unique characteristics of
the argument. Those tools become part of
a hybrid that qualifies the combination of external world and brain as a
unified cognitive system.
The Complementarity Argument (CA henceforth) proposes that it is important to understand cognitive tools as providing complementary operations to those that come most naturally to biological brains. The CA advocates that parts of the world are useful as cognitive tools, or technologies, because they perform functions that the biological brain cannot naturally do well.
Essential to all CA assertions is the view that the external environment allows humans to break down complicated cognitive processes into small processes that the biological mind is more naturally suited to completing. For example, a large multiplication problem can be broken down into smaller patterns easily completed by the brain (e.g. 586*394 is computed by 4*6 then 4*8 and so forth). Then the numbers written down according to the more simple multiplication can be combined to solve the original larger problem. The pen and paper not only serve as a type of non-neural memory, but also as a tool for breaking down a large sequential problem into smaller parts which are more readily and naturally processed. As Ed Hutchins writes:
Such tools permit the users to do the tasks that need to be done while doing the kinds of things people are good at: recognizing patterns, modeling simple dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the environment. (Hutchins, 1995; pp.155)
The things our brains are not expert at (e.g. long sequences of operations, intricate combinations of mental tasks, etc) are achieved more accurately, or made possible, by using a variety of cognitive technologies. Clark and others (Deheane et al., 1999) argue that words and linguistic labels themselves are an original type of cognitive technology (Clark & Thornton, 1997). For specific discussion see Clark & Thornton (1997; pp. 57-67) and section 3.1.2 in this paper.
CA is a distinctive argument for cognitive extension because it offers a
theory of how human brains repeatedly create and exploit various species of
cognitive technology so as to expand and re-shape the space of human reason (
I now turn to introduce Social Constructionism as important meta-theory for developing alternative underpinnings for knowledge management.
2.2. Social
Constructionism
Social constructionist theory can be portrayed in a variety of ways across many disciplines (Tuominen et al, 2002; pp.3). In the context of KM close similarities can be drawn with information studies, with the work of Touminen, Talja and Savolainen being influential:
Social constructionism focus on talk, interaction and language use in various contexts. In information studies, constructionism provides a dialogic viewpoint to study the assumptions and implicit theories that people draw on when they engage in information practices and produce accounts of them. (Tuominen et al, forthcoming; pp.1)
Work by Touminen, Talja and Savolainen seeks to capture the socially and linguistically shaped ways of understanding information practices. Social constructionism in knowledge management is taken to mean the focus on dialogue and discourse as the essential elements in people describing and producing their experiences. Dialogue and discourse stress the role of language in the building of social reality. All associated experiences, emotions, identities and social worlds are language based, and thus best researched with a dialogue and discourse focus.
2.2.1. Language and context
The core of social constructionism is language. A leading contributor to the social constructionist development in information studies is Sanna Talja who describes information as being concerned with what people do with language and what language does to people (Talja, 1997; pp.70). Information in this context is therefore language based with social, political and historical contributions. Knowledge can be defined in very similar terms for individuals, particularly understood within an organizational setting, which will be explored in Section 3.
2.3. Summary
I am not proposing a blind or naïve adoption of EM and social constructionism, rather an exploration of how they could be applied to KM if over time they prove valuable. Some intricacies of extended cognition and social constructionism have not been delved into here for reasons of space. For a wider analysis of EM including criticisms see Haugeland (1998); Jackendoff (1996); Eliasmith (1996); Van Gelder (1995); Clark (2001a; pp.120-139).
The intention here is to present the core elements of extended cognitive theory and social constructionism as they are understood in their own literature. These core elements will now be applied to KM to explore possible similarities and benefits.
3. Knowledge
Creation And Sharing
John Nosek offers an understanding of knowledge that draws on a variety of sources and provides a conceptual starting point for applying the discussion in section 2 to knowledge management. For Nosek knowledge is the capacity to act, including the capacity to conceptualize (Nosek, 2004; pp.57). Following on from this definition, tacit knowledge is a capacity to act that is constructed without the person being aware of it. Similarly, explicit knowledge is the same with the person being aware of it. Further to this definition of knowledge, cognition is the process where capacities to act manifest themselves (Nosek, 2004; pp.57). Nosek’s understanding of cognition can be seen as the mental processes that create capacities to act (knowledge). These definitions are interesting and can be explored in a number of ways. In the following sections I will focus on tacit knowledge and incorporate language into the discussion.
3.1. Tacit
Knowledge
Tacit knowledge can be understood in a variety of ways, and I want to employ a very basic understanding within the context of KM. Michael Polanyi developed silent or tacit knowledge as the kind of knowledge which we routinely use and take for granted, such as the ability to recognize the face of a friend: it is irreducible to explicit knowledge and cannot be articulated (Polanyi, 1958). Numerous distinct developments of this idea have taken place within and outside KM, but applying this to KM means the following for this paper:
The collection of knowledge contained within an organization that resides within individuals and is not constructed externally.
This tacit knowledge comprises the expertise and know-how of an organization, used every day throughout organizational processes. In some cases both the individual and organization may be unaware of such knowledge existing, as Nosek suggests (Nosek, 2004; pp.57). Following the discussion of EM and social constructionism I want to investigate two questions in terms of tacit knowledge management in the following sections:
1. Can extended cognition and social constructionism propose new ways of understanding the sharing and creation of tacit knowledge?
2. What implications are there for tacit knowledge management within this new understanding?
I suggest a focus on tacit knowledge because of the importance of language in sharing such knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be consulted via documents, or other physical manifestations, while tacit knowledge is mentally based. In particular, if we employ Nosek’s definition the possessor of tacit knowledge may be unaware of it. In such situations language, and dialogue, become crucial in trying to understand tacit knowledge i.e. in most tacit knowledge sharing situations verbal communication is crucial for the knowledge possessor to get at what they know and the receiver to try and gain the knowledge. As will be argued in the following section, dialogue and verbal communication play a crucial role in understanding similarities between EM and social constructionism. To begin answering the two questions above I will explore the knitting together of extended cognition and social constructionism.
3.1.1. Extended Cognition And Social Constructionism Allied
The most prominent link between social constructionism and EM is the emphasis of context. Environment is crucial to each. The EM argument proposes environmental objects as crucial to understanding human cognition, while social constructionism promotes context and environment as critical to understanding the construction of meaning and experience. Human cognition and experience do not occur within a vacuum, and neither does knowledge creation nor transfer. The importance of social context is identified in a variety of KM literature, with Lang’s recent work very relevant (Lang, 2004) and also De Long & Fahey (2000) and Firestone & Mcelroy (2004). KM is recognizing that inter-organizational knowledge transfer occurs within a specific social context, which is extremely relevant to KM strategies and initiatives (Lang 2004, p.89).
3.1.2. The Linguistic Aspect
A more subtle alliance between EM and social constructionism is more specific and potentially fruitful because of its possible developments. Within the argument for extended cognition there are sub-arguments for language itself being a cognitive technology, as mentioned in section 2.1.2. The central tenant of this linguistic focused argument is that language, both verbal and written, provides tools for humans to alter and enhance their cognitive activities. This argument proposes public language constitutes more than inter-personal communication, which is the most obvious role of language. Language can also reorganize information in a way that compliments the human brain, thus augmenting human cognition in a potentially extended sense. The core of this argument is that language enables us to pursue manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and information in a way which would not be possible, or would quickly overload, the human brain. Written words and spoken words allow us to search, store, order and reorganize information in much more advanced manners than the brain by itself.
3.1.3. Nosek’s ‘Group
Cognition’ And Scrabble
Following this linguistic aspect of Extended Mind theory, there are a
variety of ways to argue for language as cognitive tools for humans. Nosek offers one
argument for language involved in cognition, represented in this passage:
…cognition has changed from where all cognition is individual to where cognition is predominately group cognition. When I speak of cognition being predominately group cognition, it is… that all cognition is social and emphasizes the role of language and society in one’s thinking. At the most elemental level, individuals use words within their minds and with others to think about something. This reflects the views of several researchers who emphasize that language strongly and directly affects thought. (Nosek 2004; pp.59)
Nosek’s conception is of a shared language that is processed internally (i.e. mentally), but collectively forms a type of group knowledge. While this argument is interesting, and has potential links with theories being forwarded here, it is important to establish that the argument I am making for language involved in cognition is distinct to this. The two examples I want to briefly examine are common to most of us:
¨ For Scrabble players, it is common practice to place Scrabble tiles in ways to stimulate thought and present possible word fragments. Such a strategy is a basic example of using the external world of language as part of a cognitive process; for a full discussion of Scrabble strategies in this theme see Kirsch (1995).
¨ Another simple example is the writing of an academic paper. Words presented on the screen are cut and pasted, rearranged and manipulated to stimulate ideas and lines of arguments. Is the language on the screen purely reflecting the inner knowledge of the writer? In as much as the words direct, refine, alter, offload and instigate the writer’s thoughts they compliment cognition in a categorically similar way to the Complementarity Argument.
3.1.4. Language In Summary
Language still allows communication, which is its most obvious cognitive
application. The argument here is that
further to communication, an extension of cognition is possible based on the complementarity of language as a cognitive tool. The possibility of language and brain being
part of a hybrid cognitive process is intriguing in its possible implications
for knowledge management and I will focus on such possibilities in section 4.
I conclude with a passage from Andy Clark summarizing the spread of cognition into the world via language:
… language is so ubiquitous it is almost invisible; so intimate, it is not clear whether it is a kind of tool or an added dimension of the user. But whatever the boundaries, we confront a complex coalition in which the basic biological brain is fantastically empowered by some of its strangest and most recent creations: words in the air, symbols on the printed page. (Clark, 1998; pp.183)
This coalition of language and brain does not exclude the concept of group cognition as Nosek proposes it, but it shifts the focus onto language outside the body. Importantly, EM does not specify that language is the medium of biological cognition; rather it avoids definite understandings of the biological brain and focuses on how the brain seems to relate to the world. In general terms it is not legitimate to say EM is not interested in the workings of the biological brain. Many EM researchers are actively involved in such research, but EM is generally not sympathetic to the traditional cognitive view that a ‘mental language’ exists. EM is more allied with connectionist or dynamical models of biological cognition. For further discussion see Clark (2001a; pp.79) and Lepore & Pylyshyn (1993; pp.315).
Given this external language focus, three issues will be presented below as potentially interesting implications for KM based on the coalition of extended cognition and social constructionism.
4. KM:
Implications For Technology, Culture And Architecture
And emphasis on language in knowledge creation, as produced by cognition, allows for a series of very interesting implications for KM to be explored. If we allow that language is a type of cognitive technology and we understand an organization as a particular social context which produces experiences and meanings for the individuals within it, how can we utilize dialogue and social context to enhance KM initiatives and strategies? Three areas are proposed as important to investigate, with an explicit focus on relevance to tacit knowledge.
4.1. Technology
The demarcation between person and technology blurs in the EM perspective. Nosek proposes useful suggestions in terms of group cognition for improving technologies that allow ‘anytime, anyplace collaborative work’ (Nosek, 2004; pp.63). Collaboration through communities of practice (CoP) and across wider organizational groups can be better encouraged through developing technology that seeks to utilize dialogue and language to enhance cognitive activities. Viewing the technology as part of a hybrid cognitive system significantly reorientates the purpose of the technology in a way that can enhance the creation and transfer of tacit knowledge. Although a characteristic of tacit knowledge is the lack of acknowledged construction, dialogue and language are crucial in trying to communicate tacit knowledge. Technologies that are geared to aiding the cognitive acts of sharing tacit knowledge not only potentially enable the sharing of tacit knowledge, but also its creation by allowing for the development of such knowledge in a socially constructed context. The reorientation of technologies, and particularly software, to this purpose is complex and only a gesture towards ideas and questions can be made here because of space.
4.2. Culture
If meaning and experience are created in a socially constructed way then the culture of an organization is crucial to its knowledge functions. Clearly a strong influence is the dialogue of the organization - the expression of ideas and communication through language. Understanding the importance of dialogue can lead to initiatives that value it, and utilize it for creating and sharing knowledge. A particular emphasis is tacit knowledge as it is often only expressed in dialogue, since it cannot be (or not easily) captured and codified. Dialogue through a variety of means, particularly story-telling and communities of practice, can create an environment of rich tacit knowledge creation and sharing, which in turn will help develop a culture geared to tacit knowledge sharing. Dialogue can also play an important role in explicit knowledge creation and transfer. Indeed, organizations that do not strategically need to value tacit knowledge could make other applications of social constructionism and EM to an explicit knowledge context.
4.3. Architecture
A final potential implication for KM is the ergonomics and design of physical spaces. If cognition is seen to extend into the physical environment, efforts can be made to design buildings in ways that capitalize on this. Open space technology is a developing collaborative tool, especially useful in sharing and attempting to capture tacit knowledge, which relies on well-designed physical spaces. Encouragement of collaborative dialogue could be one goal, or more integrated workspaces where technology and human are less distinct could be another. This area of development is relatively untapped, and could be streamlined with other research into KM and architecture (Brand, 2003; Davenport & Bruce, 2002).
5. Conclusion
The multi-tiered effort of this paper is to integrate social constructionism and extended cognition within KM. The linguistic emphasis of EM and social constructionism provides intriguing points of similarities, which has many potential implications for KM. With a particular focus on tacit knowledge, because of the important role dialogue plays in attempting to share tacit knowledge, three areas of research justify future research, namaely: technology, culture and architecture. Organizational memory is also a relevant topic to explore in relation to EM and social constructionism, with interesting links to the work of Sparrow (1999) and Tuomi (1999).
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