Epistemological Problems
Concerning Explication Of Tacit Knowledge
Ilkka Virtanen, University of
Tampere , Finland
ABSTRACT:
Many authors in the
contemporary knowledge management literature have highlighted explication of tacit knowledge as one of
the most important functions of modern organizations. However, the theories
stressing the importance of explication of tacit knowledge have to adopt
assumptions from both Polanyi’s theory of knowledge and objectivist theory of
knowledge, in which case the resulting epistemological view often remains
puzzling. We analyzed the epistemological foundations of the idea of
explication of tacit knowledge. We argue that the idea of explication of tacit
knowledge is based on a combination of two different epistemological views that
are shown to be mutually incompatible in certain significant aspects.
Keywords: Epistemology, Explication, Explicit
knowledge, Objectivism, Polanyi, Tacit knowledge
1. Introduction
Tacit knowledge has been
one of the most discussed concepts in area of knowledge management (KM) during
the recent years. Tacit knowledge is usually defined as “knowledge difficult to
articulate” (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Baumard 1999), and is therefore often used to refer to
practical knowledge, such as expertise, know-how and professional intuition
that are rooted to personal experiences. It has been also contrasted with
codified, objective knowledge that is easy to share in words and numbers (Busch
2008).
The main motivation for the
popularity of the concept in the area of management studies is the widely
supported claim that organizations can achieve competitive advantages by using
effectively their unique knowledge (Spender 1996). According to many authors,
individuals’ tacit knowledge is particularly important source of unique and
sustainable knowledge in the organizational context (e.g. Argote
and Ingram 2000; Kikoski and Kikoski
2004). Various authors have remarked that individual’s tacit knowledge might be
of little advantage for the organization if it is not shared among other
members of the organization (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi
1995; Kikoski and Kikoski
2004). That is why explication of tacit
knowledge has been particularly discussed topic in the contemporary KM
literature.
The concept of tacit
knowledge is adopted from Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. Polanyi, however, did
not present a condensed definition of the concept, which partly has led to
varying interpretations of his theory. Accordingly, while some authors (e.g. Kikoski and Kikoski 2006;
Sternberg 1999) stress the importance of making tacit knowledge explicit to be
further shared, others (e.g. Tsoukas 2003; Hislop 2005) argue that explication of tacit knowledge is
not possible. These two different views are said to represent two different
epistemological schools, objectivist
epistemology and practice-based
epistemology respectively (Hislop 2005). Thus, the possibility of explication of tacit
knowledge is a significant and widely discussed issue in the contemporary KM
literature.
The core of this problem
goes back to the question concerning the nature of tacit knowledge; what is
tacit knowledge, and what kind of epistemology the concept presupposes in its original sense? These questions are the
key to better assess the possibility of explication of tacit knowledge
independently of scholarly emphases. Although epistemic problems are not the
most central matter of management studies, these questions cannot be completely
bypassed if theories concern knowledge conversions or creation of new
knowledge. However, this seems to be often the case in KM literature dealing
with the concept.
We claim that the
explanation of the nature of tacit knowledge must be based on Polanyi’s
epistemology for three reasons:
I.
There
is generally no disagreement over the origin of the concept. This is a widely
recognized fact that most of the KM theorists also mention.
II.
Polanyi
spent a great deal of his career studying this phenomenon and developing his
epistemology. Therefore, as far as is known, he is the scientist who has
studied the phenomenon most thoroughly.
III.
According
to our understanding, not only the expression providing the definition of the
concept but the entire theoretical context signifies the concept to be defined
(Bunge 1967). Hence, the meaning of a concept in a certain theory is dependent
on the theory itself (Tuomela 1973). Therefore,
separating the concept of tacit knowledge from the rest of Polanyi’s
theoretical framework includes the risk of unintentional conceptual change if
the original theory is not taken into account.
The theories that stress
the importance of making tacit knowledge explicit differ in an epistemological
sense from Polanyi’s theory because Polanyi did not make ontological
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge equivalent to the distinction
often presented in KM literature (usually claimed to be adopted from Polanyi).
Thus, we address the question, what kind
of epistemological theory is required for a procedure of explication of tacit
knowledge. The theories stressing the importance of making tacit knowledge
explicit generally seem to lack this kind of theoretical considerations.
We claim that the
epistemology that enables the explication of tacit knowledge presumes a
combination of two different kinds of epistemologies that are, however, shown
in this work to be mutually incompatible. In this sense the idea of explication
of tacit knowledge seems to lack theoretical plausibility. Also, the introduction of the concept of tacit knowledge to a different kind
of epistemological environment seem to have led to distortion of the
original meaning of the concept.
2. Related Work
According to Cook and Brown
(1999), the traditional understanding of the nature of knowledge is widely
adopted in the literature concerning organizational knowledge. They call this
view an epistemology of possession
due to its way to treat knowledge as an entity that people can possess; it
highlights objectivity of knowledge and therefore privileges explicit knowledge
over tacit knowledge. However, Cook and Brown remark that there is more
epistemic work being done in something that humans can do than can be accounted
in terms of knowledge that humans possess; knowing is doing. Cook and Brown
call this view an epistemology of
practice. It stresses that knowledge is essentially about human activity,
and furthermore, knowledge is embodied in people. Cook and Brown’s thinking
seems to refer also to subjective aspects of knowing. Therefore, this view
raises new issues from the perspective of knowledge sharing compared to the
epistemology of possession.
Hislop (2005) makes practically the same
distinction between two schools based on different kinds of epistemological
assumptions; objectivist perspective
of knowledge assumes that knowledge is an objective entity possible to be
codified into explicit facts by cognitive processes in the human brain. On the
contrary, practice-based perspective
stresses that knowledge is embedded in practice. This means that knowledge is
not seen as an objective entity that can be separated from people. Instead,
development of knowledge is seen as an ongoing process that involves the whole
body; it is impossible to disembody that kind of knowledge from people into
objective form. In table 1 are presented the epistemological core assumptions
of these schools according to Hislop (2005).
Table 1:
Differences Between Objectivist And
Practice-Based Epistemologies
(Hislop, 2005; Cook And Brown, 1999)
|
Objectivist epistemology |
Practice-based epistemology |
|
Knowledge derived from an intellectual process |
Knowledge is embodied in practice Knowing/doing inseparable |
|
Knowledge is disembodied entity/object |
Knowledge is embodied in people Knowledge is socially constructed |
|
Knowledge is objective facts |
Knowledge is culturally embedded Knowledge is contestable Knowledge is socially constructed |
|
Explicit knowledge (objective) privileged over tacit
knowledge |
Tacit and explicit are inseparable and mutually
constituted |
|
Distinct knowledge categories |
Knowledge is multidimensional |
From the objectivist
perspective sharing of explicit knowledge is a trivial procedure because
explicit knowledge is considered to be objective. Also sharing of tacit
knowledge is seen possible when enriched with the presupposition that tacit
knowledge can be converted to explicit. Instead, practice-based epistemologies
do not generally support the conception of explication of tacit knowledge.
Given that our interest is focused in the idea of explication of tacit
knowledge, in Hislop’s terms our analysis
concentrates particularly on the so-called objectivist view.
Despite that the KM field
is closely related to the philosophical questions concerning the nature of
knowledge, it is obvious that its main interests are not in analysis of the
definition of knowledge but in more practical questions such as utility and
value of knowledge, and knowledge sharing. Thus, theory of knowledge in this
context seems to stress the form in
which knowledge may appear. This perspective is understandable as the main
concern is management of knowledge.
On the other hand, in the
area of philosophical epistemology, validity
and origins of knowledge have been the most fundamental problems since the
times of philosophy of Ancient Greek (Vehkavaara
2000). Therefore, the meaning of the term epistemology
in the context of KM is somewhat looser compared to epistemology as a branch of
philosophy that addresses issues concerning what
knowledge is and what justifies it.
Despite the more pragmatic aims of theories of KM, the traditional
epistemological problems, should not be left uncovered––at least if the
resulting KM models are expected to be theoretically coherent and credible.
3. Different Characterizations Of Knowledge: Traditional, Objectivist And Polanyian Views
Traditionally knowledge has
been defined as justified true belief, which is the classical definition of knowledge (Niiniluoto
1996). However, the traditional view on knowledge is not totally unproblematic.
Gettier (1963) was the first to show that a justified
true belief can be false, suggesting that the classical definition of knowledge
is inadequate. Thus, there is no generally accepted consensus about the
definition of knowledge. Nevertheless, the classical definition of knowledge is
often some kind of basis or at least an important point of reference for any
epistemological considerations. Therefore we briefly discuss what the
traditional view consists of, and what kind of properties it requires of
knowledge.
According to the classical
definition, knowing something posits that the thing being known must be
believed. In this sense belief is the basic component of knowledge to which the
truth and the justification conditions are set (Scheffler
1965). To believe something is mentally to represent it as true (Graham 1998).
Hence, belief is a mental state in which a subject holds a proposition to be
true. To represent something mentally as true naturally includes an idea that
the knowing subject is conscious of that
belief (Vehkavaara 2000).
The content of the belief
must correspond the prevailing state of things in
reality in order to be regarded as knowledge; it is intuitively clear that a
false proposition cannot be known (Steup 2008). However, the truthfulness does not make the
belief knowledge according to the classical view. For example, in the case of a
lucky guess it does not seem reasonable to claim that the subject knew how the things were because the
subject had no rational explanation for the belief. In this sense it have to be assessed, what the grounds are for holding the belief. Therefore, a theory of
knowledge is most basically a theory about epistemic justification because
justification makes a belief “epistemically permissible”
(Pollock and Cruz 1999).
According to Vehkavaara (2000) the condition of justification
presupposes that knowledge can be expressed in a form of propositional
sentence(s), because an essential idea behind the condition of justification is
that the “verification” of knowledge should be repeatable, or at least
examinable, by anyone. Indeed, justifiability of knowledge is specifically
related to the ability to publicly present evidence supporting a claim (Niiniluoto 1996). Thus, knowledge is supposed to be presentable linguistically. Also, the
propositional form of knowledge suggests that no knowing subject is actually
required, because a justified, true proposition exists as an ideal object
independent of the knower and time (Vehkavaara 2000).
In this sense the condition of justification seems to have a close connection
with objectivity.
3.1. Objective Knowledge And
Objectivism
As explained earlier, the
theories that highlight the importance of explication of tacit knowledge are
related to objectivist-based epistemological tradition (Hislop
2005; Cook and Brown 1999). Objectivism
can be understood as an ontology or an epistemology.
Objectivist ontology (metaphysical objectivism) refers to the idea that there
is one objective reality that exists independently of human mind (Niiniluoto 1999). We can perceive the existing reality with
our senses, but the understanding we form about the world might not be entirely
correct. Thus, objectivist ontology concerns the world and its form of
existence. Instead, objectivist epistemology holds that our knowledge
concerning the world is objective.
Objectivism as a branch of
epistemology has a history starting from late 1950’s. It refers to Ayn Rand’s philosophical view that a knowing subject can
acquire objective knowledge of reality only through reason. Objective knowledge
can be formed from a perception in a process of concept formation and reasoning
(Darity 2007).
Consequently,
epistemological objectivism essentially concentrates on the objective nature of
reality and on the justification of knowledge. It seems even useless to deal
with the question of the relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge from
the perspective objectivist thinking because, strictly speaking, the notion of
inarticulate and vague (tacit) knowledge is senseless within the objectivist
theory of knowledge; the theoretical framework of objectivism simply does not
support such a conception.
In the next subsection we
present the core of Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. It is precisely the
requirement of justification that differentiates Polanyi’s thinking from the
traditional view.
3.2. The Core Of
Polanyi’s Epistemology
According to Polanyi (1958)
epistemological theories of the time had described human knowledge too narrowly
because an absolute objectivity was traditionally emphasized as an attainable ideal
for knowledge. He claimed that modern science that was based on disjunction of
objective and subjective aimed to eliminate passionate and personal human
appraisals of theories from science. Polanyi claimed that if all the knowledge
were objective, it would be impossible to make scientific discoveries. Instead,
scientific discoveries were often made on the basis of unexplained informed
guesses, intuitions and imaginative ideas that reflected some kind of tacit knowledge. From this critique of
modern epistemology and philosophy of science raised the concept of personal knowledge. According to
Polanyi, all the acts of conscious mind included a personal coefficient; “Into every act of knowing there enters a
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and … this
coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge.”
(Polanyi 1958 p. viii)
Consequently, Polanyi adds
subjective elements of knowing to the traditional conception of knowledge; the
knower is situated in the most fundamental position instead of what is being
known. The knower does not simply pick up the meaning of knowledge but actively
forms it by integrating his personal appraisals to the thing that is being
known. This is exactly opposite approach to epistemological objectivism, which
claims that knowledge should be independent of the knower. However, Polanyi’s
theory is not subjectivist. Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge has
strongly objective element because it affirms the possibility to establish
contact with knower-independent reality (Mitchell 2006). Thus, in the
ontological sense Polanyi’s theory refers to realism.
3.3. The Structure Of
Knowing: Subsidiary And Focal Awareness
The major feature of
Polanyi’s theory is a distinction between two kinds of awareness that are
involved in all conscious acts. Focal awareness concerns the object of
conscious act represented in the mind, for example a perception of an external
object or a propositional belief. Subsidiary
awareness refers to the basis on which the focal awareness operates.
Processes of subsidiary awareness provide the elements that the focal object
consists of. For example, when we perform a skill, we attend focally to its
outcome, while being only subsidiarily aware of the
several moves we coordinate to this effect (Polanyi 1969). The most essential
idea of the theory is that while attending to focal awareness a person dwells in subsidiary awareness that
contains subsidiary elements, or clues, of the focal target. Polanyi (1964 p.
xiii) explains:
When we are relying in our awareness
of something (A)
for attending to something else (B), we are but subsidiarily
aware of A. The thing B, which we are thus focally attending, is the meaning of
A. The focal object B is always identifiable, while things like A, of which we
are subsidiarily aware may
be unidentifiable. The two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive: when we
switch our attention to something of which we have hitherto been subsidiarily aware, it loses its previous meaning.
This is the structure of
knowing that Polanyi sees valid for all
acts of knowing. The idea is that the thing we are focally aware of as a
result of a conscious act is formed subsidiarily of
tacit elements, which enriches focal knowledge with personal coefficient.
Therefore we base our knowledge of the things we are focally attending to
something more fundamental.
For example, if we observe
a moving object, we see thousands of rapidly changing clues as one, unchanging
object; we are not aware of calculations of changing distances, variations of
light or movements of our eye muscles, but simply the focally attended object
(Polanyi 1968). The resulting visual perception is a matter of focal awareness.
We cannot reach clues, calculations and physiological functions that take place
in the subsidiary awareness enabling our knowledge of the focal object. The
process has only one direction terminating in the focal awareness.
According to Polanyi the
two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive; we cannot attend to both of the
awareness at the same time. In fact, we cannot attend to what is functioning subsidiarily at all, because the moment we shift our
attention to the subsidiary elements, it becomes focal losing its subsidiary
meaning, and having its own subsidiary basis. Polanyi describes (1968 p. 31)
this in a following way:
… Anything serving as a subsidiary
ceases to do so when focal attention is directed on it. It turns to a different
kind of thing, deprived of the meaning it had in the triad.
Therefore, the meaning of
tacit knowledge cannot be seized on by
definition. For example, we can shift our focal attention to movements of
our eyes (a subsidiary element) while observing a moving object, but it changes
radically our perception; the thing we are now attending to (the movements of
our eyes) is focal and we can understand hardly anything of how it functioned subsidiarily as a part of attending to the moving object.
3.4. Justification Of
Knowledge According To Polanyi
The focal part of knowing
corresponds relatively well to the belief in the traditional definition of
knowledge; the focal representation is the conscious understanding that the
knowing subject forms of the object of knowing, and that the subject might be
able to articulate. However, this focal “belief” is a result of something more
fundamental, not the starting point of the knowledge, as it is in the
traditional definition of knowledge.
As all knowing is based on
tacit elements in Polanyi’s theory, objective knowing is not possible by
definition. However, logical deduction is a process that comes near explicit
knowing in the sense that it is based on connecting focal items, namely the
premises and the consequent (Polanyi 1975). The deductive conclusion is
attained using operations with fixed mental structures, which minimizes the
need of indwelling to subsidiary awareness because the premises are already
given (Polanyi 1965). The most important difference between deduction and
knowing based on tacit subsidiaries is that deduction is a reversible process;
it is possible to go back mechanically from the consequence to the premises.
However, knowing based on tacit subsidiaries is not similarly reversible. It is
not possible to go back from the integrated focus to its subsidiaries (Gill
2000).
Thus, in addition to being
capable of stated clearly, explicitness seems to refer also to the possibility
to trace the origins of the focal knowledge––the justification would make knowledge more explicit.
However, knowledge cannot be exhaustively
justified because it is always based on unspecified particulars (Polanyi
1968). This logic leads to the
culmination of Polanyi’s theory: the rejection of the idea of fully explicit
knowledge.
This claim might seem
problematic because it questions our ability to e.g. to verify scientific
knowledge claims, meaning that knowledge would always be only subjective.
Polanyi (1958) answered this problem by stressing that knowing is a responsible
act that claims for universal validity. As he (Polanyi 1958 p. 65) puts it:
It is the act of commitment in its
full structure that saves personal knowledge from being merely subjective.
Intellectual commitment is a responsible decision, in submission to the
compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true.
Therefore even scientific
knowledge claims cannot be verified by means of explicit articulation. The
confirmation of scientific knowledge claims would require the use of skills and
insights, which themselves lie outside of empirical demonstration (Gill 2000).
Instead, knowledge will be tested in reality that all knowing agents can
access; knowledge will justify itself in case it is worth it. On the other
hand, reasons that justify our beliefs can be repealed as our understanding of
the subject area accumulates. This, indeed, seems to be often the case in
science.
4. Epistemological
Framework For The Idea Of Explication Of Tacit
Knowledge
The idea of explication and
sharing of tacit knowledge was originally made famous by Nonaka
and Takeuchi (1995) in their theory of organizational knowledge creation. Their
SECI-model describes conversions between tacit and explicit knowledge types.
The most essential part of the model is the conversion of tacit knowledge to
explicit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Since the
publication of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory tens of
authors have embraced the idea of explication of tacit knowledge.
The idea of explication of
tacit knowledge is rooted on the distinction between explicit knowledge and
tacit knowledge (Hislop 2005). E.g. Nonaka and Konno (1996 p. 42) make the point clear by
stating: ”There are two kinds of knowledge: explicit
knowledge and tacit knowledge.” Despite this classification, many authors still
recognize some kind of inseparability between these two types (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Ambrosini
and Bowman 2001). However, explication of tacit knowledge seems to logically
presume such a classification; the aim, after all, is to convert knowledge
existing in a tacit form to more exploitable explicit form. Generally speaking,
there hardly is any conversion of one form to another form if two or more
different forms are not presupposed.
According to KM theories
embracing the idea of explication of tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge is
seen codified, impersonal and objective (Hislop
2005). As Nonaka and Konno (1998) put it, ”Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and numbers
and shared in the form of data, scientific formulae, specifications, manuals
and the like.” Thus, explicitness seems to refer to the form in which knowledge
is presented. Also, explicit knowledge is assumed to include the correct
meaning unchangeable and ready to be received by anyone. This characterization
of explicit knowledge clearly sets a strong objective nature to that kind of
knowledge and corresponds well the traditional definition of knowledge.
Tacit knowledge is usually
defined as subjective knowledge that is not
yet explicated, considering tacit knowledge as a latent resource that
needs to be shared (e.g. Sternberg 1999; Nonaka and
Takeuchi 1995; Kikoski and Kikoski
2004). The use of the concept of tacit knowledge in general is very
inconsistent depending on author, but according to the usual characterization
it refers to expertise or know-how that is difficult to articulate.
Hislop (2005) considered the theories
concerning explication of tacit knowledge objectivist opposing them to
practice-based epistemologies. However, this classification of epistemologies
seems somewhat crude in a sense that the idea of vague and non-justified
knowledge cannot be accepted easily into the realm of objectivist thinking, in
which the strict justification is a fundamental requirement for knowledge. For
example, expert’s intuitive hunch simply is not knowledge according to
objectivist definition because it is not based on rational, objective
reasoning. In order to be useful or even understandable a concept must be
supported by other concepts within a conceptual system. This is not the case of
the concept of tacit knowledge within the objectivist framework. However, the
theories concerning explication of tacit knowledge would consider intuition as
an instance of tacit knowledge.
Therefore, the theories stressing the explication of tacit knowledge are not
objectivist. Rather, they seem to be some kind of extensions of traditional
view on knowledge, because according to these theories objective and “real”
(explicit) knowledge can be created basing on non-specific forms of ”knowledge” (tacit
knowledge).
In sum, the theories of
explication of tacit knowledge seem to be based on a relatively straightforward
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. The notion of explicit
knowledge comes from traditional view on knowledge, whereas the notion of tacit
knowledge is based on Polanyi’s theory of knowledge. Since there is no explicit
knowledge according to Polanyi’s theory, and unjustified tacit knowledge seems
rather questionable idea from the perspective of traditional theories of
knowledge, explication of tacit knowledge requires an epistemological
environment that combines Polanyian elements with
traditional idea of knowledge.
4.1. Explication Of
Tacit Knowledge Enabling Epistemology
The idea of explication of
tacit knowledge presupposes that the inarticulate tacit knowledge is first made
articulate. An articulated, explicit form of tacit knowledge can then be shared
with other individuals. This idea clearly has a strong objectivist
presupposition; as long as tacit knowledge is explicated, it is supposed to be
understandable and usable by others as such.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have considered
the definition of knowledge that their theory presupposes. They (p. 58)
explain:
In our theory of organizational
knowledge creation, we adopt the traditional definition of knowledge as ”justified true belief.” It should be noted, however,
that while traditional Western epistemology has focused on ”truthfulness” as
the essential attribute of knowledge, we highlight the nature of knowledge as
”justified belief.”
Nonaka and Takeuchi do not make clear whether
this definition concerns both explicit and tacit type of knowledge. If this is
considered to be a general definition of knowledge, and knowledge is then
supposed to have various types, this implies that the definition concerns both
types of knowledge; both tacit and explicit knowledge are justified beliefs.
However, according to
Polanyi’s theory indefinable tacit elements cannot be rationally justified,
which makes knowledge partly unjustifiable in general. Also, as Vehkavaara (2000) remarks, a requirement of justification
presupposes that the representation of knowledge in question can be made linguistic. However, the most common
feature of definitions of tacit knowledge in the KM literature is the problem
of articulation. Also, intuitive knowing is often equated with tacit knowledge
in KM literature. It is self-explanatory that an intuition is just an intuition
exactly because of the lack of justification; it is a feeling of knowing
something without a well-defined explanation. Therefore the requirement of
justification supposedly cannot concern tacit knowledge in these theories.
Consequently ‘justified
belief’ may only concern ‘explicit knowledge’ in the theories that make the
distinction between different types of knowledge. This seems to place tacit and
explicit knowledge in an unequal position in a way that is contrary to
Polanyi’s thinking; instead of being a fundamental basis of all knowing, tacit
knowledge is seen rather as some kind of possible resource for new, ”real”
knowledge. Now, in the case of explication of tacit knowledge it is logically
presumed that tacit knowledge functions as a justification of explicit
knowledge as it is the only source of this attained knowledge. However, if
tacit knowledge itself is at most very weakly justified, can it function as a
justification of something else?
In sum, the idea of
explication of tacit knowledge seems to provide that the attained objective
knowledge is based on a weak justification, that is, for example on
characterizations of beliefs, hunches and implicit know-how. In other words,
the requirement of objectivity of knowledge is seen to true, but the
application of Polanyi’s thinking leads necessarily to rejection of requirement
of rational justification. Hence, the resulting epistemology seems to be a
combination of Polanyian epistemology and the
traditional view on knowledge; it both assumes and rejects some features from
both views. This idea is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1:
A Model Of Explication Of Tacit Knowledge
Enabling Theory Of Knowledge
The
concept of tacit knowledge comes from Polanyi’s theory of knowledge, but the
idea of explicit knowledge corresponds to the traditional,
or even objectivist view, on knowledge. The resulting theory of knowledge has
to reject some features both from Polanyi’s theory of knowledge and from the
traditional view on knowledge (struck through in the upper boxes of the
Figure). The features that the resulting theory of knowledge adopts from these
theories are highlighted in the upper boxes of the Figure. The problems concerning the
combination of these two different types of epistemologies are discussed in the
next section.
5. Problems Of The Explication Of Tacit Knowledge Enabling Epistemology
Given that the basis of
Polanyi’s theory of knowledge was a critique against the objective ideal of
knowledge, it is not surprising that these two views conflict in some crucial
points. This is also why an epistemology that combines features from both of
these theories seems to head for some theoretical problems.
5.1. Non-justified Objective Knowledge
The idea of accepting
non-strict criteria for the basis of objective, explicit knowledge that can be
exchanged between individuals seems to be controversial in itself.
In a theoretical level, to attain reliable objective knowledge it should be
derived and justified by anyone based on the same criteria––this is the basic
idea behind the requirement of justification; people should end up having the
same conclusion, which cannot be generally expected if there are no
recognizable premises or if the premises vary a lot from individual to
individual.
As objectivist epistemology
(and also Polanyi) states, logic and reason are the most straightforward means
to attain fully objective knowledge. Objectivist epistemology considers this
possible, whereas Polanyi rejects the idea of fully explicit knowledge.
However, neither of these epistemologies, nor the traditional view on
knowledge, accepts that objective
knowledge can be based on vague justification.
Let us consider a concrete
example of a theoretical problem that follows from this view. Kikoski and Kikoski (2004 p. 72),
among others, illustrate the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge by
giving characteristics that distinguish tacit knowledge from explicit
knowledge:
Ø Explicit (known): Public,
conscious/aware, logical, certain, strong, hard, structured, goal oriented,
stable, direct perception, rules/methods/facts/proof.
Ø Tacit (not yet known): Private,
unconscious/unaware, alogical, uncertain, fragile,
soft, unstructured, indeterminate, unstable, indirect, subception,
intuition/sensing.
Drawing from Polanyi, Kikoski and Kikoski (2004 p. 73)
state: “all knowledge either is tacit, or is rooted to tacit knowledge; that
is, explicit knowledge depends on and is encompassed by tacit knowledge.”
However, following their characterization of different knowledge types it seems
logically controversial, that strong, certain and stable knowledge is based on
fragile, uncertain and unstable knowledge.
Therefore, tacit knowledge
understood as a foundation of all knowledge (the Polanyian
conception) simply is not compatible with the idea of objective, explicit
knowledge. If the idea of fully objective knowledge is, however, still adhered,
it leads to distortion of the concept of tacit knowledge; its original
intension must be modified in order to make it fit the new theoretical
environment.
5.2. Simplified Image Of
Tacit Knowledge
Polanyi’s notion of tacit
knowing goes far beyond the idea of tacit knowing defined merely as intuition
or context-specific know-how that accumulates as a result of experience.
Instead, tacit knowing belongs inextricably in all conscious acts. The
predominant conception of tacit knowledge in the KM literature that supports
the idea of explication of tacit knowledge seems therefore to be based on
simplification of the concept of tacit knowledge.
Let us consider an example
given by Sternberg (1999 p. 232) as he explains the way explication of tacit
knowledge reduces individual differences:
For example, if, in the past,
knowledge about the importance of buying the boss a gift for his or her
birthday was tacit, those who possessed this knowledge were at distinct
advantage. But if now everyone knows and uses this piece of knowledge, it will
no longer serve to differentiate employees, in the boss’ eyes, and most likely
some other as––yet tacit knowledge will take its place. As this example points
out, tacit knowledge can become explicit.
The awareness of certain
way of action (as in this case) is hardly unspecified or subsidiary. “Tacit
knowledge” in this example, namely the awareness of the importance of buying
the boss a gift, seems to be a focal belief (justified or not) that can be
shared if wanted; someone simply knows
or believes that buying a gift is
important in certain culture. This kind of conception of tacit knowledge has
very little to do with Polanyian contents of
subsidiary awareness. In fact, we might critically ask,
what additional value or explanatory power the introducing of concept of tacit
knowledge brings to this example?
The way intuition and its
relation to tacit knowledge are discussed in the literature of management
studies serves as another example of the simplified conception of tacit knowledge.
Nonaka and Konno (1998 p. 42), among others, argue
that intuitions and hunches fall into the category of tacit knowledge. Also Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe externalization (the
conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge) by saying that the use of
figurative language is a way to articulate intuitions and insights. From this
seems to follow that articulation of intuition is considered to be articulation
of tacit knowledge, which pretty much equates tacit knowledge with intuition.
However, it is important to make a distinction between the conscious
representation of unexplained feeling of knowing something (simplified view on
tacit knowledge) from the meaningful elements that precede and enable the feeling of knowing (Polanyian
view on tacit knowledge).
The sensation of knowing a
solution (not to speak of its verbal description) belongs in Polanyi’s terms to
the focal, not the tacit, part of that act. Indeed, a relevant question seems
to be, where the sensation of knowing does come from. Why is the intuition just
that and not something else? An intuition must be based on something because
otherwise it would be just a random guess. In Polanyi’s terms integrated
subsidiary knowledge that finally forms the focal sensation remains unexplained
in the process. Thus, intuition is an innate sensibility to coherence that
cannot be explained with rules or algorithms (Polanyi 1966). The knowledge on
which intuition is based remains tacit. As Polanyi (1968 p. 42) puts it:
It is intuition that senses the
presence of hidden resources for solving a problem and which launches the
imagination in its pursuit. And it is intuition that forms there our surmises
and which eventually selects from the material mobilized by the imagination the
relevant pieces of evidence and integrates them into the solution of problem.
Therefore, if intuition
itself is equated with tacit knowledge, we logically need a third level of
knowledge that is even more quintessential than tacit knowledge, namely the
instances of meaning that form the intuition. Although intuition indeed is an
outstanding manifestation of tacit knowing, tacit knowledge does not seem to
become articulated in the process of articulation of the intuition. Instead,
intuition seems to only reflect knower’s tacit resources more or less the same
way that a skilful performance reflects performer’s skills that also cannot be
described in words.
5. Conclusions
Explication of tacit
knowledge has been proclaimed as the most important function of modern
organisations in the contemporary KM literature. However, it seems that the
theoretical grounds of this idea has not been profoundly studied, which cuts
down the plausibility of the theories stressing the importance of making tacit
knowledge explicit. On the other hand, the development of efficient practises
is based on coherent theories. This suggests that the conception of knowledge
still calls for more theoretical development and research also in the
organizational context.
We have described two
significant theoretical problems of the idea of explication of tacit knowledge.
First, the division of knowledge into tacit and explicit.
Interestingly, many authors claim that the classification of knowledge to tacit
and explicit comes from Polanyi’s theory of knowledge (e.g. Baumard
1996; Spender 1996). To be sure, focal (“explicit”) and subsidiary (tacit)
knowledge are central concepts in Polanyi’s epistemology. However, the
distinction is not ontological, but functional. Polanyi did not say that certain
things are known tacitly, while others are known explicitly. Instead, the
distinction describes the structure of knowledge that concerns all acts of knowing being the basis of
Polanyi’s theory of knowledge–it is not a theory of the
existence of two types of knowledge.
Second, theories that
embrace the idea of converting tacit knowledge to explicit are based on two
mutually incompatible epistemologies. The concept of tacit knowledge is
obviously adapted from Polanyi’s theory of knowledge, whereas the characterization
of explicit knowledge corresponds objectivist theory
of knowledge. The most crucial contradictory feature is the view that these
theories take on the requirement of justification. Interestingly, many authors
seem to bypass this controversy. Hence, the focus seems to be on the questions
concerning application of tacit knowledge whereas the considerations concerning
the theory of knowledge that the application of the concept presupposes are
almost completely bypassed.
Polanyi’s theory does not signify
that people could not share knowledge or have same conceptions concerning
reality. Knowledge does not have to be entirely objective for that people could
act efficiently together. The guidance of an expert undoubtedly is an immense
help when a non-professional tries to assimilate a certain skill. Therefore we
do not want to question the methods and goals of the theories of knowledge
creation. However, this does not change the fact that the concept of tacit
knowledge is being used in a questionable, simplified and even incorrect way in
some of the KM literature, which has separated its meaning from its original
role as a foundation of conscious acts, reducing it to refer to any type of
knowledge that is difficult to manage.
Tacit knowledge is first and
foremost a theoretical concept (i.e. a concept introduced by a theory), and
hence, its application even in more practical environment should be based on
the original theory. However, many authors seem to base their conception of
tacit knowledge on the loose idea “knowledge difficult to articulate” that can
refer to virtually any mental or social phenomenon. As the extension of a
concept grows this way, it is in danger to become unclear, even meaningless,
nonsense.
7. Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to
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About the Author:
Ilkka Virtanen works as a researcher at Department
of Computer Sciences at University of Tampere, Finland.
Ilkka Virtanen, Department of Computer
Sciences, 33014