ABSTRACT:
This paper uses a model of doubting to demonstrate why a long term eradication programme has faced so many complex problems in its implementation. Analysis of a qualitative case study of the Fox Eradication Project in Tasmania identifies aspects of accuracy, source and relevance, demonstrating how the credibility of new triggers is undermined, thereby enabling individuals to maintain their current mental model rather than accepting new knowledge to adapt or amend it. The analysis illustrates how doubt can be managed either through prevention, perturbation or boundary spanning. It is suggested that the process of establishing what is leading to doubt enables a change manager to consider alternative communication and implementation strategies which directly address the alterations of mental models.
Keywords: Doubting, Boundary spanning, Managing change, Organisational learning,
Adaptation, Mental models
1. Introduction
In 1998 a fox was seen walking off
a ferry in
In 2006 the renamed Fox Eradication
Program (as it will be referred to in this paper), was provided with the
clearer remit which was to eradicate foxes in
“We suspect a fair
part of the effort of the team has gone into the debate with sceptics who doubt
the existence of foxes in
In this paper, we are not concerned with whether there are foxes in Tasmania or not; rather we are interested in why, despite apparently strong scientific (Sarre et al., 2013; Berry et al., 2007; Saunders et al., 2006) and anecdotal evidence over the last 10 years, there are still high levels of doubt within the Tasmanian community. This doubt matters because the substantial amount of time spent trying to change the belief sets present within the community is slowing the ability of the Fox Eradication Program to achieve their goals. In other words, they cannot get ‘Buy In’ to the changes and ideas because of the ongoing doubt.
We will firstly outline a model of doubting developed by Blackman and Henderson (2004) explaining the possible triggers for doubting and their potential impact upon community perceptions. This model will then be applied to data collected in a project seeking to determine how similar events could be better managed in the future. We conclude by arguing that using such a model earlier in the program’s history might have enabled alternative viewpoints to be more clearly recognised and alternative ways of communicating and managing the program to be considered. We will argue that understanding this case and applied theory will help to explain failures in change implementation and enable alternative strategies to be elaborated.
2. Precursors Of Doubt
The ability of an individual to make informed judgements on any topic is affected by their mental model of the world and how that is developed over time. Mental models are a means by which organisations and individuals create and share meaning, thereby enabling common understanding and the development of knowledge (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995; Hayes and Allison, 1998; Flood, 1999; Pruzan, 2001). The mental models provide frameworks of value and belief systems which act as the basis for formal analysis, policy and procedure development and cultural development for both individuals and groups (Caldwell et al., 2002; Smith, 2002; Swaaet al., 2002). They can act as a context for the interpretation and understanding of new information (Kim, 1993; Doyle et al., 1994). Such understandings support learning and act as a framework for all new knowledge development. These systems of understanding become the extent of the individual’s bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) and actions emerge as a result of the mental models currently held. Consequently, for new learning to occur, individuals need to be aware of any stimulus generating a perception of difference between mental models (Klimecki and Lassleben, 1999). This process is described in Figure 1. Once an individual perceives a difference, he/she will rationalise it and, if accepted, this new stimulus will be internalised and the individual’s mental model will be adjusted.
Figure
1: Mental Model Adjustment (Adapted from Blackman and Henderson, 2004, p. 260)
This view of a mental model as a framework for new knowledge development means that it could also act as a closing mechanism. Blackman and Henderson (2004) argued that although the difference may be perceived, the way that it is accommodated may not lead to change. Where a difference is perceived it may be that, instead of rationalising and accepting the new information and considering what can be learnt, the difference may be doubted for some reason, usually the source, the context or the relevance; thus, the veracity of the idea will be undermined and the difference rejected (Blackman and Henderson, 2004; see also Lee-Kelly et al., 2003) as in Figure 2.
Figure
2: Single
In theory, based upon the process identified in Figure 1, any new stimulus offered to an individual will lead to some form of change. However, this presupposes that the system is ‘open’ to all new ideas and that any stimulus is automatically assimilated into a mental model which will then be changed. It has been argued (Ackoff, 1971; Blackman and Henderson, 2004; Jones, 2005; Kast and Rosenzwieg; 1972) that in fact many systems are ‘Simultaneously Open and Closed’; this is where, in cognitive terms, the brain receives the signals but, rather than simply accepting the new stimulus (and, therefore, being open) it assigns meanings constructed from previous experiences and, consequently, may reject some ideas or reframe them in some way. This leads to the process of doubting as shown in Figure 2 where the stimulus is detected as being incongruent with the current mental models. One of two things will then happen: either the existing mental model will be doubted and the new information used to elaborate or change the model, or the difference will be doubted and a reason found to reject it, thereby preserving the mental model intact. Blackman and Henderson (2004) identify three sources of doubt: accuracy, source and relevance.
2.1. Accuracy
In this case the individual finds evidence within their current mental model which permits them to reject the new evidence. Examples of this can be seen in the climate change debate, where individuals from both sides of the debate continually use their evidence to show how their view is accurate and the alternative explanations are invalid (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004). Considerable effort can be undertaken to make it permissible to reject the new information rather than to accept or assimilate it.
2.2. Source
Doubt emerges where, for some reason, the person receiving the stimulus has apparent cause to mistrust the source of the new stimulus. There is evidence of this problem within the ‘knowledge stickiness’ literature where Szulanski (1995, 2000) demonstrates that mistrust of an individual or entity, based upon a previous encounter, leads to the subsequent rejection of any ideas from that source.
2.3. Relevance
An individual may choose to doubt or reject a new stimulus because they consider it to be irrelevant to them in some way. It is not pertinent to their thinking at the time and, consequently, gets ignored. This happens when an individual is scanning their environment for ideas or news and, in certain cases, simply overlooks evidence because it does not seem to be important to them.
What we will show in this paper is how individuals and groups have reacted
in these three ways over a long period of time, in ways that enabled them to
doubt the veracity of the existence of foxes in
3.
Methodology
As indicated above the Fox Eradication Program has been in existence, in one
form or another, for over 10 years and yet there is still considerable debate
in Tasmania as to: (a) whether there are foxes (Marks 2010; Smith, 2011; Sully,
2009), (b) whether money should be spent eradicating foxes (Bungey, 2012), (c)
how foxes should be eradicated (Obendorf, 2010; Marks, 2010) and (d) if it is
already too late (Landcare Research New
Such a project required knowledge and appreciation of the different perspectives of a range of stakeholders; this, plus the sensitive nature of the topic in Tasmania led to the development of a qualitative approach to the data collection. The exploratory nature of the study required a qualitative approach (Creswell 2003; Crotty 1998). A case study approach was chosen following Yin (2003a; see also Tellis, 1997) who argues that they are particularly appropriate where the observer has access to a novel, previously unexplained phenomenon. The purpose of the case study was to provide insight into the issue, thereby enabling deeper understandings of the governance issues within the organisation and the way that the various stakeholders perceived them. In this case, it is not the comparison of data with other organisations that gives it meaning (although looking at governance in other situations is useful), but comparison with current theory and the ability to develop novel ideas from the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003b; Stake, 1995). This fits with the current research purpose, which is not to generalise from this single case but to develop theory which might contribute to better management of pest incursions in the future.
Data collection was twofold: first, an in-depth documentary analysis of all the reports, reviews, media releases, press reports etc. relating to the program over its history in order to (a) develop a clear timeline, (b) determine the decision points during the case history and (c) sensitise the researchers to the range of viewpoints and arguments that have been made during the period. Second, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a range of stakeholders. 42 interviews took place over a one year period (see Table 1*).
Stakeholder |
Number *Some people are represented in more than one area. |
Members of the Technical Advisory Panel (TAP) |
5 |
Members of the Stakeholder Reference Committee (SRC) |
2 |
Non-FEP Members of the Management Committee |
2 |
Fox Eradication Program (FEP) |
24 |
Fox-Free Taskforce (FFT) |
12 |
Senior DPIPWE staff |
2 |
Members of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) |
2 |
Key doubters |
3 |
DPIPWE Communications |
1 |
People who conducted a review of the Fox-Free Taskforce program |
2 |
Member of the community who has had no involvement in the issue |
1 |
Table
1: Details Of The Interviews
Although it may appear that the community is less well represented here, analysis of reports included two community surveys and many representations from community to formal reviews such as the PAC and informally via the local newspapers. All the interviews were de-identified, transcribed and entered into NVIVO and the data were analysed both thematically and axially (Pandit, 1996). From this, combined with the documentary evidence, it became clear that a range of doubting behaviours were being demonstrated and the doubting framework was then specifically applied to the data. What is important, and will be seen below, is that many of the stakeholders were in agreement in terms of what led to doubting emerging through the case history. We use quotes below to indicate themes and ideas rather than as indications of the number of times that ideas were cited.
4.
Findings
4.1. Accuracy
The fundamental issue in terms of accuracy was whether there are foxes or
not and this is still a heavily debated issue within
Not seeing foxes has continued to spark concern, especially as “we’ve had hundreds of cameras out there ... now the good news is they haven’t seen anything. That’s really good news. But of course we get attacked because they haven’t seen anything” (FEP). However, it enables the media to report the lack of sightings.
Credibility of the evidence has been an issue and there have been reported
problems with the robustness of the data. According to some interviewees from
both the FEP and the doubters, early on the ‘chain of evidence’ was not as
robust as it could have been and this was widely reported. Consequently, some
of the ‘proof’ has been challenged because of the way it was collected or
stored, enabling people to doubt if a carcass was a fox, if it was really
killed locally and so on (IACRC, 2006: Marks, 2010 ). There are still issues
currently and one interviewee stated that
“we’ve got people criticise it [DNA evidence of populations] on the grounds that – the word being used
now is easily transportable [i.e. fox scats could easily be planted, even
brought into
There are also concerns because the science seems to change; it is both developing and new and so the question is raised as to whether it is ‘true’ or just an unfounded experiment. The scientists find it normal that they will develop ideas over time, but for the lay people the developments of ‘faecal’ DNA testing and apparent changes in the level of activity they could expect to see, led to enough confusion to create doubt.
Money is another area where there is enough discrepancy to lead doubt: “So it’s a $5 million-ish program. Compared to a species eradication program,
that’s actually not very much money at all” (Senior DPIPWE staff) “It’s just that for them to continuously
say, ‘Well they’ve spent 30 or 40 or 50 million’, when it’s to date over a decade been about 21
of combined state and Commonwealth” (FFT/ FEP). There figures circulated in
the Media are continually different from the officially reported figures and,
despite the more formal nature of the reported figures, the reality is that
most community members assume the higher numbers are nearer the truth. It gives
credence to concerns over both the actual governmental spending and the
trustworthiness of politicians, thus fuelling the next cause of doubting; the
source of the ideas.
4.2. Source
This element of doubting deals with the source of the information. Szulanksi (2000) argued that where the source
of new knowledge was not perceived as reliable, perhaps because they are
thought to have their own agenda, or to have a history of not being truthful,
there is likely to be resistance to accepting ideas from them. In this case it
means that because of who is providing the stimulus to change, the individual
will not alter their mental model. The first problem in Tasmania is that there
is considerable distrust of government in general and so there is generally
scepticism about what they say; almost all the interviewees mentioned the lack
of trust in government as a matter of fact and an integral part of the
Tasmanian context. A recent survey into
community attitudes undertaken by the FEP demonstrated extremely low levels of
trust in all three levels of government.
The FEP itself was assessed on a par with local government and more
trustworthy than the wider State Government and the Commonwealth. Moreover, there was concern about the
original location and format of the Fox Free Taskforce: “Now they initially put this
project with National Parks – a bad mistake” (FFT/ FEP); “There’s the fact that the Program was
initially run by Parks and a lot of people have had issues with Parks and
Wildlife Service or a lot of people just have issues with government employees
in general” (FEP). Concerns were
also raised that there was not enough commitment made to the program early on
when it was needed: “... the government
dilly dallied about its actions and it did not make any commitment to a program
that was likely to be successful” (FFT).
In the early days the team was seen
to be unprofessional and unreliable making it easier to ignore them. There was
a view described as “We’re spending lots
of money and they’ve got cars and guns and uniforms and here we are trying to
do whatever we’re doing as general public and these guys are off gallivanting
around and having a good time” (Senior DPIPWE staff). Hunting is a popular sport in
Another major issue is the
portrayal of the program in the media. It is argued that the message passed on
to the community is negative: “So that’s you
know ... at worst it’s a different scientific opinion and they’re accusing us
of bad science, is what they should be able to do. But they don’t say, “You have bad
science. You did that autopsy
poorly. You recorded things poorly,”
whatever. They say, “You fabricated
it.” And no one comes back to defend us”
(FFT/ FEP). “We’re still, after eight
years of the program, having to justify the existence it - now, we don’t have
to justify it to the three parties, or the state and the Commonwealth
governments, they’re on board. What is
it about the media that is still like a dog with a bone … the Stateline started with “Are they
here, or aren’t they?” (FEP). In a time when most people use TV or
newspapers as their sources of news and information, the fact that they almost
always contain a negative perspective on the program inevitably leads to doubt.
This was amplified by a departmental strategy of not automatically responding,
which meant that not all the voices were heard equally. One member of the FEP
felt that there needed to be more communication earlier to try to overcome this
form of doubt: “The other thing too is
that when we have gone on the front foot with proactive media-like community
engagement issues and that I still think it’s not done far enough in
advance. You’re almost giving people
this is what we’re going to do, without having given them sufficient lead time
to understand the problem” (FEP).
Overall, there were enough
dissenting voices and concerns about who was doing what to enable individuals
to reject the new ideas and the reality of foxes. Over time ignoring the issue
becomes the norm, increasing the likelihood of the third form of doubting, as
the debate and the apparent outcomes lose their relevance.
4.3. Relevance
For many the issue of foxes in
Another concern is whether it is still really a problem: the argument is
made how it can still be relevant when there is no new evidence: “…something could be produced that I would
see as credible. It doesn’t have to be a
movie, but certainly something that has a higher level of credibility than has
been produced to date. And it’s been
going on for so long”
(Community); “an underlying belief in
certain sectors of the community that unless we can produce bodies clearly
there’s nothing here to be finding” (FEP).
So as time goes on the level of interest wanes and the information is
often just ignored: “apart from the
occasional media piece it’s just not on my radar” (Community). From time to
time the media will rekindle some interest (usually in a form that encourages a
different form of doubting) but, for many, unless something new emerges foxes
have become irrelevant.
Type of Doubt |
What is Doubted |
How |
Accuracy |
Science |
The data are challenged because of the way they have been collected or stored |
|
|
Credibility of the evidence |
|
|
New science so is it ‘true’ or just an unfounded experiment |
|
Outcome |
The likelihood of eradication is questioned |
Source |
Fox Free Taskforce |
The early team was seen as ‘gung ho’, unprofessional and unreliable |
|
|
Doubters make arguments against the team |
|
|
Team is accused of ‘making it all up’ |
|
Government |
|
|
Media |
Mostly negative press supporting doubters and encouraging doubt |
|
|
Always questioning
‘are there foxes in |
|
Scientists |
Seen to be pushing the agenda for their own gain |
|
|
Not seen to ‘prove’ the issue |
|
|
Lack of response or ‘push back’ to media stories led to assumption they were accurate |
Relevance |
1080 |
The use of 1080 leads to mistrust and a view that this is an excuse to use it |
|
|
Causes confusion about its use and concerns over dogs etc. |
|
Currency |
People argue that they cannot see evidence and so not happening now so not interesting |
Table
2: Examples Of Forms Of Doubting Applied To The Fox Eradication Case Study
Table 2 summarises the ideas outlined above demonstrating what is doubted and how this was emerging for each of the types of doubting. What we now consider is what we need to learn from this.
5.
Discussion
The findings clearly show that there is evidence of all three forms of doubt
within the data. The result is that it becomes possible for members of the
community to consistently resist adapting their mental models to incorporate an
acceptance of the existence of foxes in
5.1. Prevention
Prevention, whilst optimal will always be difficult to achieve. In the case
of fox eradication in
A lack of trust, as was evident in this case between the community and
government, as well as the sceptics and the FEP will always reduce the
effectiveness of communication and subsequent knowledge transfer (Goh, 2002;
Levin and Cross, 2004; Szulanski, 2000). Whilst it is understandable that the
government felt they should not engage in confrontational dialogue with the
critics, by not doing so it fuelled suspicions that there was substance to the
accusations and claims. As early as 1956 Mellinger demonstrated that a lack of
trust would reduce the efficacy of communication. Tway (1994) defined trust as
being ready to interact with someone or something and developed
a model of trust which included three components: the capacity for trusting by all parties, the
perception of competence of all parties, and the perception of mutually serving
intentions. This last could be seen to manifest as serving the common good and
so, if this can be demonstrated and supported, it might be a way to overcome
doubt.
These ideas help explain the doubt in this case as all previous experiences in Tasmania had made the propensity for trust weak. There was a perception of incompetence rather than competence and, although initially there was enthusiasm for the program when it was first identified as a need (Courtney, 2002; Bryant, 2002), a view of the program and those working within it working for themselves rather than the wider community encouraged a break down in trust. In such a situation the potential for doubt was strong.
5.2. Perturbation
A perturbation is a disturbance of some kind which alters
the current state and equilibrium. In this case we argue that once doubt has
developed, to overcome it there must be a managed perturbation which will
enable trust to be re-established and a reopening and elaboration of the mental
models. A successful perturbation will need to reflect Simon’s (1991) work on
Bounded Rationality as, if there is no connection between the new
communications and the individuals current mental models, any potential
perturbation will simply be ignored.
It is important to consider what form of perturbation
could have changed the path of the Fox Eradication Program. Clearly, more
dramatic evidence such as the discovery of a credible fox carcass or
identifiable pictures in key locations would act as a perturbation but this
cannot be predicted; indeed for those involved such evidence is indicative of
failure. There will need to be something that enables one, or all of the
sources to be reconsidered. Most importantly, it cannot merely be more of the
same evidence. Whilst the original scat evidence (Sarre et al., 2007) was able
to create a perturbation, particularly within government, and provide greater
impetus for the Fox Eradication Program to develop its plan, comments attached
to recent reports of two new scats (Naidoo, 2012) demonstrate that all they do
is enable the same conversation to be repeated – it does not change the
dialogue in any way (Table 3).
Just two sets of scats? Did
these foxes just fly into If anyone rips off Centrelink,
there is big trouble. Now the fox farce force is ripping off Forde M at 11.11 am Friday
'small numbers' of DNA-fox containing scats but none linked to actual foxes
anbd no to scats from the same fox. Justifying the fox eradication program as
a precaution for the release of multiple foxes might have been acceptable for
3, 4, 5, even 6 years but without any authentic proof of foxes established in
Better to pay a smaller amount
of money now that suffer a huge financial loss if a fox population gets
established. That's the difference between here (small numbers) and |
Table
3: Examples Of Responses To The Two New Scats Reported
This exchange of views demonstrates that more scats will
not actually be a perturbation and are unlikely to change the pattern.
Possibilities for change might emerge from changing the discussion with the
community, altering the way the program is run, finding other sources for trust
etc.. The answer is complex but what will not work can be established – merely
pushing back in any of the areas in Table 2 will not be enough: for change
there must be a new form of conversation delivered by people who are seen as
reliable and credible. The recent change of leadership, baiting strategy, name
change and focus of the work may help, but only if different dialogues can be
developed. The crucial aspect is to prevent the only conversation being a rerun
of those already displayed large in the media.
5.3. Boundary Spanning
The data indicates that the strong set of mental models held
by each of the different stakeholders become boundaries around a set of
knowledge and the doubting process is reinforcing this. Such boundaries emerge
where there are divisions of social structures, differentiating roles, actions
or, as is the predominant situation for this case, specialised domains (Aldrich
and Herker, 1997; Carlile, 2004; Hazy and Tivnan, 2003; Star and Griesemer,
1989); the boundaries are creating a barrier between the groups who need to
work with each other in order to integrate their different fields of knowledge
if there is to be effective eradication. Hazy and Tivnan, (2003) argue that the
ability to undertake boundary spanning activity directly impacts upon an
organisation’s ability to effectively deal with change, especially in a dynamic
or uncertain environment. The more context specific the knowledge, the greater
the need for parties to transfer, translate and transform it across boundaries
created within their specific domain by the differing languages, assumptions,
goals and objectives.
To overcome the doubt emergent in cases such as the Fox
Eradication Project in
Boundary spanning is where individuals with specialist
skills actively manage actively manage across the boundaries (Aldrich and
Herker, 1997); the skills may be technical and allow translation of ideas
between groups, or they may be individuals skilled at facilitating between
different parties. In either case they will undertake cooperation,
collaboration or coordination activities in order to achieve mutual
understanding and necessary outcomes (O’Flynn et al., 2010). In the case of the Foxes project community
engagement was seen as a cooperative activity at best where information was
shared in order to gain support. By recognising the need for boundary spanning
earlier, a more collaborative approach might have been adopted actively seeking
the help of community rather than mere acceptance of the project and access to
property. Such approaches have been used
effectively in other pest eradication and management projects and our data
explains why this approach has had better outcomes. Utilising a boundary
spanning approach might enable the prevention strategy outlined above or it
would provide a potentially more effective
approach to ongoing project management where there are conflicting
stakeholder views.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a model of doubting to demonstrate why a long term eradication program has faced so many complex problems in its implementation. Issues of accuracy, source and relevance are shown to undermine credibility of new knowledge triggers enabling individuals to maintain their current mental models rather than adapt or amend them. This explanation offers insights as to how to develop strategies which could lead to mental model revision considering the usage of prevention, perturbation or boundary spanning strategies to better manage doubt. We argue that the ideas presented here are equally applicable to other areas of change where there needs to be ‘buy in’ from individuals if there is to be movement. The process of establishing what is leading to doubt enables a change manager to consider alternative knowledge transfer, communication and implementation strategies which directly address the alterations of mental models. We suggest that this is an under researched area within the change management literature and that by focussing more upon the role of doubting and mental model reinforcement there may be a new way devised to enable knowledge to support adaptation to change.
7.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the Invasive Animals CRC for their support in funding this research.
8.
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About the Authors:
Professor Deborah Blackman, Business, Government and Law,
Amy Corcoran, Institute of Applied Ecology,
Professor Stephen Sarre, Institute of Applied Ecology,
Deborah Blackman is a Professor in
Management specialising in organisational learning and knowledge management.
Her research focuses upon the possibilities and probabilities of knowledge
transfer in a range of contexts. She also teaches and researches in human
resources management, focusing upon capacity and capability development. Recent
research projects include considering how to learn lessons about invasive
animal incursions from the Fox Eradication Program in
Amy Corcoran is a Research Assistant who has recently completed a degree in International Studies and Community Development. She previously worked for Outward Bound Australia working with adults and young people to develop communication, team building and leadership skills.
Stephen Sarre is a Professor of
Wildlife Genetics. His research interests emphasise endangered and invasive
species, with particular interest in applying DNA markers to the genetic
analysis of wild populations. Stephen also studies sex determination in
reptiles considering how the interplay between genetic and temperature
ultimately determines sex. Stephen is a member of the Invasive Animals
Cooperative Research Centre, a member of the International Scientific Advisory
Panel for the Allan Wilson Centre for Molecular Ecology and Evolution, and a
founding member of the Technical Advisory Panel of the Fox Eradication Program
in