The sampling of KM theory (36 in total) on which this taxonomy is based is
by no means exhaustive. A slight majority of theories are located along the
‘knowledge as social action’ axis (18, two of which are credited to Blackler,
1993, 1995), which is in fact consistent with Despres and Chauvel’s (2002)
findings. But in the present viewpoint, these are split based on their primary
focus on personal or organizational knowledge, with a number showing a
bilateral focus. This contrasts with Despres and Chauvel’s finding that theory,
in the main, denies the existence of organizational knowledge. The group of theories occupying the knowledge
as object space (17, five of which are credited to work by Nonaka and his
colleagues: e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) are all largely focused on
organizational knowledge – which is logical. If a theory posits knowledge as an
object, it seems reasonable to conclude that, in this theoretical landscape,
knowledge is seen as an object (asset) of the organization.
It is important to draw attention to the subjective nature of this
categorization of theory. The object/social action classification is based on
how authors treat the subject of their theorising – in some cases (e.g.,
Blackler, 1993, 1995; Gourlay, 2006), the author expressly states the nature of
knowledge as being social action, while with others, it is more an interpretive
choice based on the descriptive and action language used to describe knowledge
and how it is managed. On the Organization / Personal classification, the
interpretation is more straight-forward: is the theory /framework more focused
on one or the other, or is it focused on both – as units of analysis? Admittedly, a different researcher may arrive
at a different interpretation.
3.
Knowledge As Social Action
3.1. The ‘Personal’ As The Unit Of Analysis
A strong advocate of a focus on personal knowledge is Grant (1996, 2002),
making a clear reference to personal knowledge as the ‘unit of analysis’, while
criticising theories which subscribe entirely to organizational knowledge. In
his take on the ‘knowledge-based view of the firm’, Grant proposes that a
firm’s purpose is to coordinate teams of specialists so that they can integrate
their knowledge to generate new products and services. In this model, the goal
is not knowledge transfer, but knowledge integration, although this is arguably
splitting hairs.
The knowledge-based view of the firm is often interpreted as a theoretical
position (e.g., Guzman, 2009), but Grant (2002) himself questions this. None-the-less, according to Grant, it is the
knowledge constitutive of persons that is the valued asset, and that this can
only be leveraged by integration through team-work. By implication, Grant
reifies knowledge as the object of integration mechanisms: rules and
directives, sequencing, routines, group problem solving and decision making.
There is also a strong implication of the commodification of knowledge:
“(K)knowledge is the overwhelmingly important productive resource in terms of
market value...” (p 136). Yet, if one were to set aside those particular
references, Grant is also arguably positing knowledge as social action in his
emphasis on social integration practices.
3.2. Against An Epistemology
Of Possession
In this project, Grant (2002) invokes the discourse of possession, an
approach which Cook and Brown (1999) take issue with. While Cook and Brown’s theory firmly rests on
the notion of ‘knowing’ as social action, their focus is more on the
organization. They argue that the notion
of personal knowledge is limiting because it emphasises one type of knowledge
(explicit) above the other (tacit), resulting in a growing literature where
“…there typically remains an expressed or implied tendency to treat knowledge
as being essentially of one kind,” (p 382). Side-stepping the ‘traditional
epistemology of possession’, Cook and Brown argue instead for a view of
knowledge as a tool of knowing: “knowing is an aspect of our interaction with
the social and physical world, and that the interplay of knowledge and knowing
can generate new knowledge and ways of knowing,” (p 381). Cook and Brown call this interaction the ‘generative
dance’, casting it as the source of all innovation. In this sense, knowledge is not only used in,
but also grounded in action. Consequently, they argue for greater attention to
what knowledge work is done – in other words, practice. They arguably soften
their case, however, by proposing that the epistemologies of possession and
practice, whilst completely separate, are not incompatible: but, it is not
clear why Cook and Brown should want
to introduce a radically new proposal while clinging on to the traditionalist
view. None-the-less, there are synergies between their notion of knowing as
action in social contexts and the ideas proposed by, for instance, Tsoukas and
Vladimirou (2001), and Blackler (1993,
1995).
There are two other points of interest to draw from Cook and Brown’s (1999)
work: their criticism of the traditional scientific view of knowledge as
something which must be sought, found and articulated – in other words,
knowledge as object - and their strong disagreement with the proposal that
tacit knowledge can be converted to explicit, and vice versa. This avowal in particular marks this theory
as opposition to the influential theory of the knowledge creating firm (e.g.,
Nonaka, 1991, 1994), although Cook and Brown
offer no direct criticism of the latter.
3.3. Knowledge As Practice Contrasted With
Knowledge As Possession
Cook and Brown’s (1999) framework can be compared and contrasted with that
proposed by Guzman (2009), whose theory is located in the ‘personal knowledge /
knowledge as social action’ quadrant. He investigates the nature of practical
knowledge, drawing attention to the two polarised positions evident in the
literature: practical knowledge (1) held in people’s heads contrasted with that
(2) situated in practice. Similarly to
Cook and Brown’s treatment of the
epistemologies of possession and practice, Guzman reasons that the two
positions are not mutually exclusive.
Based on his review of the literature, he offers a new theory with the
aim of clarifying the confusing diversity of opinion: “(T)the view that knowledge (rules, for
example) necessarily needs interpretation to be applied, and therefore users
are the ones who determine when and how to use rules…further supports the
complementary character of cognitive (mental) and practice dimensions,” (p
87). According to this view, knowledge
is seen as a multidimensional concept which can be personal, situated and
socially constructed at the same time.
Another important feature of Guzman’s (2009) proposal is that he treats
dimensions of practical knowledge as ‘fuzzy’ – they are not clear-cut
categories, but rather form a continuum.
His aim is to explicate the various ‘quadrants’ of practical knowledge,
linking these to learning strategies. By
road-mapping the type of practical knowledge that is to be shared or
transferred between persons, the most effective learning approach can be
selected and applied. Guzman’s theory of practical knowledge has considerable
weight and rational validity, but it is not clear if the theory has been
empirically tested.
3.4. A Joint Focus: Personal And Organizational
Knowledge
Other theories which follow the notion of ’knowledge as social action’
include Boisot’s (2002) ‘I-Space’ theory of knowledge creation. Like Guzman
(2009), Boisot emphasises the role of social learning as the foundation of
knowledge creation, arguing that people do not share knowledge, rather they
share information which becomes
knowledge once internalised to the individual. In Boisot’s model, knowledge is
highly personal, and relies on shared repertoires between individuals to reach
common understandings, which thesis has resonance with Searle’s (1969) notion
of shared rules in speech acts. Thus his theory has a joint focus both on the
personal and the organizational aspects of knowledge. Although using different terminology, the theory
is also consistent with the ideas proposed by Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001),
and Cook and Brown (1999), for instance.
A divergent theme is Boisot’s leaning towards a cognitive understanding
of knowledge: “(T)the articulation of knowledge, in effect, calls for two kinds
of cognitive efforts: abstraction and codification,” (p 68).
3.5. Knowledge, Activity
Theory And Activity Systems
Frank Blackler is responsible for some of the most insightful work in the
field of KM – and some of the least recognised or understood. Blackler’s (1993)
‘Knowledge and the theory of
organizations’ is based on a modified version of Activity Theory and,
similarly to Boisot (2002), he emphasises the central role of social
learning. Activity Theory was originally
proposed by Vygotsky, working in the tradition of Psychology, and subsequently
developed by Engestrom (1987: as cited in Blackler, 1993). This focuses on the
material actions and communications processes of persons, constituting these as
the focus of study of human activity. The contexts of actions are located
within ‘activity systems’: “…the theory of organizations as activity systems
offers an antidote to simplistic interpretations of the nature of individual
knowledge and action, and organizational cultures and competencies,” (1993: p
882).
Developing on these ideas, and in proposing that people construct themselves
in action as a historically evolving process, Blackler (1993, 1995) is
advocating a constructivist approach, as distinct from a positivist or
rational-cognitive approach.
Consequently, he views knowledge as performative. He is highly critical
of the mainstream rational-cognitive approaches to KM, particularly in their
reification of knowledge, and their assumption of the rationality of both
organization and individual. There is a considerable body of evidence within
the discipline of Psychology which supports the inherent irrationality of the
human being (e.g., Chater and Oaksford, 2001).
Interestingly, Selznick (1948), in his ‘Foundations of the theory of organization,” formulates the organization
as a co-operative system of rational action which is at risk from the
‘indiscipline’ or irrationality of its participants!
Blackler also emphasises the importance of language: “(L)language is the
archetypal communal activity, integral to the enactment of practical actions,”
(1995: p 1039). Accordingly, the lens of research, practice and analysis should
be on the activity systems in which knowledge is socially done: knowledge as mediated (e.g., through language),
situated (in context), provisional (constantly developing) and contested (the
subject of power relations).
Unfortunately Blackler’s (1993, 1995) work has been largely over-looked or
even misunderstood. However there is recently an apparent shift in popularity
towards knowledge as social action and an increasing emphasis on language
(e.g., Lee and Lan, 2007). (In the
sampling of theories investigated here, since 2008, there are twice as many
‘social action’ based theories as there are knowledge as object-based
theories.)
Blackler’s work stands as an early advocate for what could be described as a
post-modernist approach to KM and, in this, his ideas have considerable synergy
with later theorists such as Tsoukas (2011).
3.6. The Phenomenological
Perspective
While Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001)’s theory is interpreted as sitting on
the ‘fence’ between both organizational and personal knowledge, at the social
action end of the taxonomy axis, Tsoukas’s later ‘phenomenological view of tacit knowledge’ (2011) quite clearly has
a focus on personal knowledge. Tsoukas’ ideas are grounded in and derivative of
those theorised by Polanyi. In his 1962
work, ‘Personal Knowledge: towards a
post-critical philosophy’ Polanyi offers a detailed and reasoned argument
for turning away from the traditional view and practice of the exact sciences -
the pursuit of objective knowledge and scientific detachment. Instead he argues
for the importance of the scientist – the ‘knower’ – in the act of discovery
and validation of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the scientist brings to
his scientific practice his own skills, commitment and experiences which must
necessarily form part of the science. Using Polanyi’s arguments, Tsoukas
criticises the modern movement towards the de-contextualization of knowledge.
Arguing for a phenomenological conceptualisation of tacit knowledge, Tsoukas,
as does Polanyi, insists that explicit knowledge cannot exist without the
tacit. This personal co-efficient factor suggests that “(K)knowing something,
then, is always a contextual issue and fundamentally connected to action…”
(Tsoukas: p 521). Synergies with the
earlier work of Guzman (2009), Cook and Brown (1999), and Blackler (1993, 1995)
are clear.
3.7. ‘Knowing How’ And ‘Knowing That’
Similarly to Blackler (1995) and Tsoukas (2011), Gourlay (2006) is a strong
critic of Nonaka’s (1994) theory of the knowledge creating firm. He steps aside
from the mainstream’s general acceptance of the tacit and explicit components
of knowledge, instead offering an explanation based on the concepts of ‘knowing
how’ and ‘knowing that’. In this paradigm, ‘knowing how’ is rooted in and
characteristic of everyday life, some of which is not capable of articulation,
whereas ‘knowing that’ emerges from the processes of reflecting and theorizing.
A further important distinction is his view of these concepts as
behaviours. He reasons, then, that to
manage knowledge, one must do so indirectly by managing behaviour which, as he
warns, raises a whole new raft of issues and the potential to destroy that
which one seeks to control. Note the synergies with the ideas proposed by, for
instance, Tousakas, through the emphasis on knowing as behaviour, which
connects knowledge – knowing something – to action.
3.8. An Architecture For Organizational
Knowledge
Moving more towards the organizational end of the knowledge as social action
axis, Brown and Duguid (1999) place communities of practice at the heart of
their proposed architecture for organizational knowledge: “(T)the hard work of
organizing knowledge is a critical aspect of what firms and other organizations
do,” (p 28). Thus, knowledge is mostly collective, and successful communities
of practice are generally informal. However, their architecture is largely
dominated by themes of command and control. Note, for instance, Brown and
Duguid’s emphasis on the ‘organizing’
work of firms compared to Grant’s (1996, 2002) thesis that the organization
exists to foster an environment in which individuals can integrate their
personal knowledge with that of others. Contrastingly, Brown and Duguid see the organization as the means of knowledge generation. Accordingly, organizational knowledge is more
important than personal knowledge – the sum is greater than its parts (Brown
and Duguid). Their framework is
largely about inter-firm communications and the establishment of human,
technological and process-based conduits through which team knowledge can be
shared amongst other teams.
3.9. Creative Abrasion
Leonard and Sensiper (2002) also pursue the notion of people sharing
knowledge in group work. Their Theory of
Creative Abrasion frames the different backgrounds, skills, experiences,
and understood social norms that individuals have as the factors which generate
the melting pot of innovation. In an earlier work, Leonard and Strauss (1997)
refer to this as different styles of human thinking. In this implied chaotic
environment, people will challenge each other, leading to an abrasion of
different ideas, which in turn give rise to new ones: “…hearing a very
different perspective challenges the mindset of those in the majority
sufficiently that they will search beyond what initially appears to be an
obvious solution,” (p 489). Moreover,
for Leonard and Sensiper it is the
tacit dimension of an individual’s knowledge which formulates them as valuable
contributors to group work and innovation, as it is this kind of knowledge
which is learned through lengthy practice, and which is inaccessible from
explicit means of communication. Whilst neither the work of Leonard and
Sensiper, nor Leonard and Straus makes any explicit reference to ‘knowledge as
social action’, they can be interpreted as presenting such a case through their
emphasis on people interaction.
As a basic idea, this is not entirely divorced from the concepts of social learning
advocated by Blackler (1993, 1995) and Boisot (2002), and is consistent with
Brown and Duguid’s (1999) communities of practice. What places this particular
theory on the organization end of the organization vs. personal knowledge
continuum is the very clear focus on the organization – in this case, teams of
workers – as the unit of analysis. In fact, Leonard and Sensiper (2002) cast the individual as
problematic through their preference for hoarding their tacit knowledge, and
their reluctance to share knowledge because of a fear of failure, or of looking
foolish. A further interesting point to draw is their acknowledgment of the
need for a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding knowledge and
innovation: “(C)clearly, many different fields of inquiry are relevant,
including ones as diverse as design, cognitive psychology, group dynamics and
information technology,” (p 495). As their theory necessarily relies on the
linguistic social interaction of persons, it is interesting that the authors
omit the more linguistics orientated scientific disciplines from their list.
None-the-less, this thesis has echoes of Peter Drucker’s (1988) visionary piece on the future
organization as largely comprising teams of specialists coming together to
perform specific projects
4.
Knowledge Reified As Object
4.1. The Dynamic Creation Of Organizational
Knowledge
At the other end of the object vs. social action spectrum, the majority of
theories which deliberately, or by implication, reify knowledge largely cluster
around a focus on organizational knowledge.
Nonaka and his colleagues’ theory of the knowledge creating firm
dominates the field (e.g., Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007; Nonaka et
al., 1994; Nonaka et al., 1996; Nonaka and Kono, 1998), and it
is to this theory that special attention is given here. At the heart of this
theory is the SECI model, which explains knowledge creation as the outcome of a
dynamic interaction between subjectivities and objectivities. Accordingly, new
knowledge is created in a spiral of interaction between the processes of
socialization, externalisation (explicit knowledge), combination and
internalisation (tacit knowledge). The
theory is located at the ‘knowledge as object’ end of the axis because of its
central tenet that tacit knowledge can and should be
converted to explicit knowledge in the fashion proposed by the SECI model. Ironically, while Nonaka and his co-workers emphasise the importance
of tacit knowledge, the central feature of their theory – the conversion of the
tacit to the explicit – implies a devaluation of tacit knowledge in that the
tacit is shown to be only useful if transformed to the explicit (Virtanen,
2011).
The idea that new knowledge can be generated in this dynamic interaction,
and which process is fertilised and promoted in the socially-engineered
environment of ‘Ba’ (Nonaka and Konno, 1998), has been the target of
considerable criticism (e.g. Gourlay, 2006, Thompson and Walsham, 2004).
Blackler (1995), one of the earliest critics, singles the theory out as being
‘rather traditional’, and is critical of its reductionist treatment of
knowledge. Grant arguably hands out a
veiled warning against theories such as this for its focus on organizational
knowledge: “(T)taking the organization
as the unit of analysis not only runs the risk of reification, but, by defining
rules, procedures, conventions, and norms as knowledge fails to direct
attention to the mechanisms through which this ‘organizational knowledge’ is
created through the interactions of individuals, and offers little guidance as
to how managers can influence these processes,” (1996: p 113).
While Despres and Chauvel (2002) condemn such theories for being too
prescriptive, representing little more than the shuffling of ideas back and
forth in structures and systems, Thompson and Walsham attest that “…his
[Nonaka’s] view of all such knowledges as objects to pass between these
different stages, has contributed to a sense that the focus of knowledge
management systems [… ] should be to ’externalize’ and ‘combine’ tacit forms of
knowledge,” (2004: p 726). This, Thompson and Walsham argue, leads to
contradiction because:
“…the meaning
of any objective ‘knowledge’ will always remain the subjective product of the
person in whose mind this is constituted, always relationally defined, and
therefore does not transfer easily to others in a form which may be
operationalized to the benefit of the organization,” (Italics, authors’
own: p 726).
As if to add credence to this argument, Virtanen’s (2011) review of the
literature concludes that most Information and Communications Technology
focused KM initiatives aim to convert tacit to explicit knowledge, reporting
that they mostly fail. The implied necessity of removing context from (tacit)
knowledge embodied in the knowledge creating firm theory is also heavily
criticised by Despres and Chauvel who argue that without context, knowledge is
meaningless: ”…meaning does not exist in the phenomena themselves,” (p
90).
4.2. Cracks In The ‘SECI’ Engine
As well as being criticised for its focus on the organization (at the
expense of the individual), coupled with the reification and
de-contextualisation of knowledge, this particular theory is censured for its
ambiguity on the one hand, and implicit distinction between knowledge and
learning on the other (Gourlay, 2006; Blackler, 1995). Many psychologists and
educationalists might disagree with the proposal that: “(T)taken by itself,
learning has rather limited, static connotations whereas organizational
knowledge creation is a more wide-ranging and dynamic concept,” (Nonaka, 1994:
p 34).
Gourlay (2006) points to the ‘cracks in the engine’ of the SECI model,
arguing that this is more a theory of managerial decision-making than one of
knowledge creation. For instance, Gourlay’s interpretation of the evidence used
to support the veracity of the theory suggests that “(I)it is difficult to
accept these statements as evidence of anything other than the managers’
beliefs about how they got ideas for new products,” (p 1418).
4.3. Misinterpretation And Misrepresentation
Perhaps most problematically is the suggestion that Nonaka and his
colleagues have misinterpreted and misrepresented the works of Michael Polanyi
(Gourlay, 2006; Virtanen, 2011; Tsoukas, 2011; Grant and Qureshi, 2006; Grant,
2007), in what Tsoukas refers to as the ‘great misunderstanding’. As the core foundation of the theory draws
from Polanyi’s work on the nature of knowledge, this is a significant
issue. The primary sticking point is
over the nature of tacit knowledge. Polanyi (1962) proposes that all knowledge
is personal, involves judgement, and contains a tacit element, which is often
difficult if not impossible to articulate. According to Tsoukas, this
establishes the contextual and action-orientated nature of knowing. However,
Nonaka’s interpretation is slightly – but crucially – different: “Polanyi
classified knowledge into two categories. ‘Explicit’ or codified knowledge
refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic language. On
the other hand, ‘tacit’ knowledge has a personal quality which makes it hard to
formalize and communicate,” (1994: p 16).
In analysing Nonaka’s interpretation of the works of Polanyi, Tsoukas concludes:
“(T)to treat practical [tacit] knowledge as having a precisely definable
content, which is initially located in the head of the practitioner and then
‘translated’ into explicit knowledge, is to reduce what is known to what is
representable, thus impoverishing the notion of practical knowledge,” (2011: p
525). In other words, while Nonaka and his colleagues (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) draw on the
works of Polanyi (1962), their interpretation and representation of it –
particularly the nature of tacit knowledge, and its potential for conversion to
explicit knowledge – is arguably misrepresentative.
A related issue has been highlighted by Grant (2007): he suggests that many
researchers in the KM field who refer to Polanyi have not actually read the
source material, but instead, rely on others’ interpretation. This, combined
with a less than critical approach to the work of Nonaka and his colleagues,
suggests Grant, is one of the underpinning reasons for KM’s lack of success.
Nonaka (1994) makes reference to the works of two other leading and
influential theorists: Argyris and Schon’s (1978: as cited in Nonaka) Double
Loop Learning in Organizations, and Anderson’s ‘Architecture of Cognition,” (1983: as
cited in Nonaka). In both instances, it can be shown that Nonaka misrepresents
these works. Argyris’ (1977) theory of Double Loop Learning (DLL) is concerned
with the goal of senior management continuously challenging an organization’s
policies, procedures, visions, objectives – people’s internal theories of
action - and so on in order to ensure progress and development, and the
avoidance or correction of error. Without this, Argyris argues, firms will
remain in a status quo and will eventually be overcome by others. Argyris
points to the difficulties in implementing DLL but, fortunately, according to
Nonaka, it is ‘built in’ to his theory of the knowledge creating firm. In reality, the only synergy between Nonaka’s theory and the theory of DLL is
Nonaka’s parole that managers should challenge what employees know. However,
Argyris is primarily talking about organizational learning as a process of
detecting and correcting error, while Nonaka is talking about knowledge in
people’s heads. Arguably, then, DLL is not ‘built in’ to the
theory of the knowledge creating firm.
Nonaka (1994) draws on a 1983 version of Anderson’s
ACT Model, however Anderson’s
later 1996 version suffices for the purpose here. In Anderson’s
model, declarative memory (which Nonaka equates to explicit knowledge) is a
schema like structure encoding a small bundle of knowledge, whereas procedural
memory (or tacit knowledge) is applied automatically, is tied to context and
can often not be articulated (Eysenck and Keane, 2001). Anderson proposes that complex cognitions are
the result of interactions between
declarative and procedural knowledge: “(A)all that there is to intelligence is
the simple accrual and tuning of many small units of knowledge that in total
produce complex cognition. The whole is
no more than the sum of its parts, but it has a lot of parts,” (1996: p 356).
He also posits that production rules, which embody procedural knowledge, can
create declarative structures. Note the use of the term ‘interactions’ (as
opposed to ‘conversion’) to describe the relationship between these two forms
of knowledge / memory. Contrastingly,
Nonaka states that, in Anderson’s theory,
declarative knowledge is converted
into procedural knowledge: “The idea of ‘knowledge conversion’ may be traced
from Anderson’s
ACT model…” (p 18). Interestingly, according to Eysenck and Keane’s
interpretation of Anderson’s
model, skill compilation leads to new skill acquisition, making knowledge a
subset of learning, whereas Nonaka offers learning as a subset of
knowledge.
Note that both DLL and ACT are absent from subsequent versions of Nonaka’s
theory (e.g., Nonaka and Toyama,
2007).
4.4. More Troubling Observations Of The Theory
Of The Knowledge Creating Firm
Nonaka (1994) describes the ‘informal community’ as the location of emerging
knowledge, a notion also promoted by Brown and Duguid (1999), and that these
need to be related to the formal hierarchical structure of the organization.
By contrast, Brown and Duguid imply that such a transformation would lose much
of the values and benefits of informally organized work groups.
Two further observations concern the temporal and cognitive nature of
knowledge. Nonaka (1994) argues that tacit knowledge refers to future events,
while explicit knowledge deals with the past, and that only tacit knowledge
comprises cognitive elements. There is no evidence for this claim, and
arguably, tacit knowledge – even if one takes the view that it is internalised,
comprising skills, difficult to articulate, the ‘more than we can tell’ element
of knowledge- could refer to the past as well as the future. Additionally, if,
as Polanyi (1962) argues, all
knowledge contains a tacit element, then it is not logical to propose that
explicit knowledge is bereft of cognitive components.
Despite these difficulties, Nonaka’s theory continues to dominate the KM
theoretical landscape, with numerous other theorists following in its wake in
one fashion or another, mainly through an uncritical acceptance and adoption of
the tacit/explicit explanation at its heart (e.g., Bhatt, 2001; Rai,
2011).
5.
Discussion And Conclusions
In this review of KM theory, the landscape has been shown to be broad,
complex, sometimes ambiguous, often confusing. To bring some clarity to this
‘sea of theory’, it has been shown that theories can be classified into the
broad categories of a focus either on personal or organizational knowledge, and
an approach to knowledge as either object – on the basis that it can be stored
and codified, for instance – or as done in social action.
This classification reveals a significant anomaly in the theoretical
literature. On the one hand, the most dominant, influential and much criticised
theory, the Dynamic Theory of the
Knowledge Creating firm (e.g., Nonaka, 1991, 1994), can be located firmly
in the category of knowledge as object, with its focus on the organizational
level, along with a number of other theories. On the other, there is arguably a
trend towards the view of knowledge as social action, but that none of these
apparently have the popularity and recognition assigned to the former. Added to
this is the perspective that KM has yet to achieve the kind of success that one
would expect from a discipline and practice that concentrates on what is widely
seen as an organization’s most important asset.
It has also been shown how the KM theoretical literature is often the
sparring ring of considerable debate, contradiction and dissent, with
accusations of misinterpretation and misrepresentation constituting a
rhetorical hall-mark. Part of these issues arguably stem from the substantial
assumptions on which many theories rest: that knowledge can be identified as a
singular thing or activity; that KM outcomes can be measured in some way; that
the tacit can be made explicit and vice versa; that this phenomenon called
knowledge resides in people’s heads, but that they must be motivated to share
it. Others assume that what will work in one culture or organization will work
in another; that with the right organizational structure, knowledge can be
commanded and controlled; and perhaps, most significantly, that language,
communication and social interaction are important, but how is not specified,
nor does this location formulate the lens of enquiry
To conclude, if KM is not perceived to have achieved any significant measure
of recognised success in practice – as some have argued – then is it not time
for a new approach? If it is the case that the most popular theory in the KM
field holds, as its central thesis, that tacit knowledge has to be converted to
the explicit, with the implied view of knowledge as an object, then the lack of
achieved success also suggests a new
approach is needed. If there is a small but demonstrable trend towards the view
of knowledge as constructed in social interaction, along with the implied
importance ascribed to language and communication, then is it not logical to
turn in this direction, but to take the enterprise much further – to the site
of action: language and talk? The analysis of how human actions are accomplished
in talk and text, and with what consequences, could represent a fresh
perspective and approach to KM. Such
studies of discourse are yielding significant results elsewhere in Organization
and Management Studies (see Philips and DiDomenico (2009) for a review). As
Hardy points out: "(S)such discursive studies are playing a major role in
the study of organizations and in shaping some of the key debates that frame
organization and management theory" (2001: p 25). Not so much a change of
direction then, as a step along the path already identified.
6.
References
Anderson,
J.R. (1996). ACT: A simple theory of complex cognition. American Psychologist, 51, (4): 355 – 365
Argyris, C. (1977). Double loop learning in organizations. Harvard Business Review, September –
October: 115 – 125
Bhatt, G. (2001). Knowledge
management in organizations: examining the interactions between technologies,
techniques and people. Journal of Knowledge Management, 5, (1):
68 – 75
Blackler, F. (1993). Knowledge and the Theory of Organizations:
Organizations as activity systems and the reframing of management. Journal
of Management Studies, 30, (6): 863 – 884
Blackler, F. (1995). Knowledge,
knowledge work and organisations: an overview and interpretation. Organization
Studies, 16, (6): 1021 – 1046
Boisot, M. (2002). The Creation and sharing of knowledge. In Choo, C. And Bontis, N. (Eds). The
Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational Management.
Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bouthillier, F. and Shearer, K. (2002).
Understanding knowledge management and information management: the need
for an empirical perspective. Information Research, 8, (1)
Brown, J. and Duguid, P. (1999). Organizing knowledge. Reflections,
1, (2): 28 – 44
Buchel, B. (2007). Knowledge creation
and transfer. In Ichijo, K. and Nonaka,
I. (Eds).
Knowledge Creation and Management:
new challenges for managers. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Burford, S., Kennedy, M., Ferguson,
S. and Blackman, D. (2011). Discordant
theories of strategic management and emergent practice in knowledge-intensive
organisations. Journal of Knowledge Management Practice, 12, (3)
Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2001). Human rationality and the psychology of
reasoning: Where do we go from here? British
Journal of Psychology, 92: 193 – 216
Choo, C. (2002). Sensemaking, Knowledge creation, and decision making:
organizational knowing as emergent strategy. In
Choo, C. and Bontis, N. (Eds). The Strategic Management of Intellectual
Capital and Organizational Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Cook, S. and Brown, J. (1999). Bridging Epistemologies: the generative dance
between organizational knowledge and organizational knowing. Organization Science, 10, (4): 381 – 400
Crane, L. (2012). Trust me, I'm an expert: identity construction and
knowledge sharing. Journal of Knowledge
Management, 16, (3): 448 – 460
Despres, C. and Chauvel, D. (2002). Knowledge, Context, and the Management
of Variation. In Choo, C. and Bontis, N.
(Eds). The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational
Knowledge. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Drucker, P. (1988). The coming of the new organization. In Harvard Business Review on
Knowledge Management. Harvard:
Harvard Business Press.
Earl, M. (2001). Knowledge Management
Strategies: toward a taxonomy. Journal of
Management Information Systems, 18, (1): 215 – 233
Ehin, C. (2008). Un-managing knowledge workers. Journal
of Intellectual Capital, 9, (8): 337 - 349
Eysenck, M. and Keane, T. (2000). Cognitive
Psychology: a student's handbook. 4th End. Hove:
Psychology Press
Gourlay, S. (2006). Conceptualizing knowledge creation: a critique of
Nonaka's theory. Journal of Management
Studies, 43, (7): 1415 – 1436
Grant, K. (2007). Tacit knowledge revisited - we can still learn from
Polanyi. The Electronic Journal of
Knowledge Management, 5, (2): 173 – 180
Grant, K. and Qureshi, U. (2006). Knowledge Management Systems - Why so many
failures? Innovations in Information
Technology, November 2006, 1 - 5.
Grant, R. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 109 –
122
Grant, R. (2002). The Knowledge-Based
View of the Firm. In Choo, C. and
Bontis, N. (Eds). The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational
Knowledge. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Guzman, G. (2009) What is Practical Knowledge? Journal of Knowledge Management, 13, (4): 86-98
Hardy, C. (2001). Researching
organizational discourse. International Studies of Management and
Organization, 31, (3): 25-47
Heisig, P. (2009). Harmonisation of knowledge management - comparing 160 KM
frameworks around the globe. Journal of
Knowledge Management, 13, (4): 4 – 31
Ichijo, K. (2007). Enabling knowledge-based competence of a
corporation. In Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. (Eds). Knowledge creation and management: new
challenges for managers. Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Jakubik, M. (2011). Becoming to know. Shifting the knowledge creation
paradigm. Journal of Knowledge
Management, 15, (3): 374 – 402
Kleiner, A. and Roth, G. (1997). How to make experience your company's best
teacher. In Harvard Business Review on Knowledge Management. Harvard:
Harvard Business Press.
Lee, M. and Lan, Y. (2007). From Web 2.0 to conversational knowledge
management: towards collaborative intelligence.
Journal of Enterpreneurship
Research, 2, (2): 47 – 62
Leonard, D. and Sensiper, S. (2002).
The role of tacit knowledge in group innovation. In Choo, C. and Bontis,
N. (Eds). The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organisational
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Leonard, D. and Straus, S. (1997). Putting your whole company's brain to
work. In Harvard Business Review on Knowledge Management. Harvard:
Harvard Business Press.
Lytras, M. and Pouloudi, A. (2006). Towards the development of a novel
taxonomy of knowledge management systems from a learning perspective: an
integrated approach to learning and knowledge infrastructures. Journal of Knowledge Management, 10,
(6): 64-80
Leonard, D. (2007). Knowledge transfer within organisations. In Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I.
(Eds). Knowledge Creation and Management: new challenges for managers. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Markus, M. (2001). Toward a theory of knowledge reuse: types of knowledge
reuse situations and factors in reuse success. Journal of Management Information Systems, 18, (1): 57 - 93
Nonaka, I. (1991). The Knowledge-Creating
Company. Harvard Business Review,
November-December: 96 – 104
Nonaka, I. (1994). A Dynamic Theory of Organisational Knowledge
Creation. Organization Science, 5, (1): 14 – 37
Nonaka, I. and Konno, N. (1998). The
concept of "Ba": Building a foundation for knowledge creation. California Management Review, 40, (3), Spring: 40
– 54
Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Nonaka, I. and Toyama, R. (2007). Why
do firms differ: the theory of the knowledge-creating firm. In Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. (Eds). Knowledge
Creation and Management: new challenges for managers. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Nonaka, I., Byosiere, P., Borucki, C. and Konno, N. (1994). Organizational Knowledge Creation Theory: a
first comprehensive test. International Business Review, 3, (4):
337 – 351
Nonaka, I., Umemoto, K. & Senoo, D. (1996). From Information processing to knowledge
creation: a paradigm shift in business management. Technology in society, 18, (2): 203 – 218
Phillips, N. and Di Domenico, M. (2009).
Discourse Analysis in Organizational Research:Methods and Debates. In Buchanan, D.and Bryman, A. (Eds). The
Sage Handbook of Organizational Research Methods. London:
Sage
Polanyi, M. (1962). Personal
knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy. Chicago:
The University of
Chicago Press
Prusak, L. and Weiss, L. (2007).
Knowledge in organizational settings: how organizations generate,
disseminate, and use knowledge for their competitive advantage. In Ichijo, K.
and Nonaka, I. (Eds). Knowledge Creation and Management: new challenges
for managers. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Quinn, J., Anderson, P. and Finkelstein, S. (1996). Managing Professional Intellect. In Harvard Business Review on Knowledge
Management. Harvard: Harvard Business Press.
Quintane, E., Casselman, R., Reiche, S. and Nylund, P. (2011). Innovation as
a knowledge based outcome. Journal of Knowledge Management, 15,
(6): 928 – 947
Rai, R. (2011). Knowledge Management and organizational culture: a
theoretical integrative framework. Journal
of Knowledge Management, 15, (5): 779 – 801
Selznick, P. (1948) Foundations of the Theory of Organization. American Sociological Review, 13, (1):
25 – 35
Smith, L. (2005). On Tricky Ground:
researching the native in the age of uncertainty. In Denzin, N. & Lincoln,
Y. (Eds). The Sage Book of Qualitative Research, 3rd Edn. London: Sage
Spender, J. (2002). Knowledge Management, uncertainty, and an emergent
theory of the firm. In Choo, C. and Bontis, N. (Eds.) The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Thompson, M. and Walsham, G. (2004).
Placing knowledge management in context.
Journal of Management Studies,
41, (5): 725 – 747
Tsoukas, E. and Vladimirou, E. (2001). What is Organizational Knowledge? Journal of Management Studies, 38, (7):
973 – 993
Tsoukas.H. (2011). How should we understand tacit knowledge? A
phenomenological view. In Easterby-Smith, M. and Lyles, M. (Eds). Handbook of Organizational Learning and
Knowledge Management, 2nd Edn. Chichester:
Wiley
Umemoto, K. (2002). Managing existing knowledge is not enough: knowledge
management theory and practice in Japan. In Choo, C. and Bontis, N.,
(Eds). The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Virtanen, I. (2011). Externalization of
tacit knowledge implies a simplified theory of cognition. Journal of Knowledge Management Practice, 12, (3), September 2011
Weber, R. (2007). Addressing Failure Factors in Knowledge Management. The
electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 5, (3): 333 - 346
Wenger, E. (2000). Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems. Organization, 7, (2): 225 - 246
About the Author:
Lesley Crane M.A., BSc (Hons) is a
Postgraduate Researcher with an interest in the professional, organizational
domain of knowledge management, from the perspective of discourse as situated
action. In addition to her academic
interests and career, she has more than 20 years’ experience working as a
professional consultant in technology supported learning and information
management. (52 words).
Lesley Crane, University
of Derby, Kedleston Road, Derby,
DE22 1GB; Tel: 00 33 (0) 553 88 96 44; Email: lesley.crane@orange.fr
